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In this paper, we study the timing of initial stock repurchases for a sample of firms from their 
IPO onwards, using panel adjusted logistic regressions and hazard models to examine which 
variables may predict and theoretical hypotheses may explain these transactions. First, we 
find that initial repurchases (in comparison with non-repurchase firms) seem to have similar 
financial characteristics of dividend initiators (relative to matched dividend postpone firms), 
as reported by Kale et al., (2006) and Bulan et al., (2006). Second, our empirical findings in 
the two multivariate empirical approaches used are particularly consistent with the timing and 
undervaluation signaling hypotheses in explaining the timing of stock repurchases, consistent 
with the results of Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) for the likelihood of less frequent stock 
repurchases. We also offer some support for the risk reduction signaling, free cash flow and 
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Studying stock repurchases is an interesting and important research activity. Stock 
repurchases are an important financial policy instrument that may affect the future of a firm 
and its strategy. In fact, stock repurchases are increasingly important transactions in most 
developed stock markets (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 2000; Lafer, 2002; 
Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002),  where  they  seem  to  have  strong  value  relevance.  Several 
empirical studies show their significant influence on the market valuation of a firm (e.g., 
Grullon and Michaely, 2004) and on managerial decision making (Baker et al., 1981; Baker et 
al.,  2003;  Brav  et  al.,  2005).  Further,  in  recent  years  stock  repurchases  have  become  an 
increasingly important instrument for distributing cash flows to stockholders, as (factual and) 
scientific evidence clearly shows (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Fama and French, 2001; 
Weston and Siu, 2002; Grulon and Michaely, 2002 and 2004, among many others). However, 
compared to the subject of stock repurchases as a whole or to the dividend initiation decision, 
we know almost nothing about the timing, motivations and determinant factors for firms to 
repurchase their stock for the first time (henceforth, initial repurchases). However, we argue 
that the timing of stock repurchases in general and the first stock repurchase in particular is an 
important issue for both researchers and decision makers. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the timing determinants of initial repurchase 
transactions  and  to  examine  the  validity  of  the  several  stock  repurchases’  theoretical 
hypotheses that attempt to explain and predict the timing of stock repurchases. We examine 
the factors that drive the timing of initial repurchases in the context of panel data by using 
several empirical approaches, including logistic regressions (to understand the repurchase-or-
postpone decision) and hazard models (to study the duration of the non-repurchase decision). 
We focus on actual stock repurchases made by US firms that went public in the 1980-2004 
period to analyze the behavior of those firms along their life cycle until their repurchase 
initiation. We believe that the methodology used facilitates a good understanding of the firms’ 
decision to repurchase their stock for the first time.  
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The papers most similar to our empirical analysis are Bulan et al., (2006) and Kale et 
al.,  (2006).  In  these  papers,  the  authors  analyze  the  timing  of  dividend  initiations,  using 
similar methodologies. Both papers claim that dividend initiation is a unique event in the life 
cycle of a firm that represents a significant change in a firm’s financial policy. We agree and 
think the same is true for the initial repurchase decision, although the literature shows that, 
contrary to cash dividends, stock repurchase transactions tend to be non-recurrent and their 
magnitude is far more volatile than period-to-period cash dividends (Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). In this context, we argue that initial repurchases might be 
motivated by a different rationale from dividend initiations and they may appear at a point in 
time for some different economic reasons. In particular, dividend initiation studies show that 
life cycle factors are fundamental to the initiation decision and occur when firms have reached 
the mature stage of their life cycles. We expect different results for initial stock repurchase 
firms. In other words, we anticipate that initial repurchase firms are different from dividend 
initiators: growth firms which present higher volatility in their operating cash flows and fewer 
cash reserves than the typical firms that pay dividends for the first time.  
First, we find that in relation to non-repurchase firms, initial repurchase firms have 
significantly higher operating cash flows, market-to-book ratios and profitability, both prior to 
and after the initial repurchase transaction. Initial repurchases are also made by firms with 
lower leverage and operating risk, on average, before and after the initial repurchase event. 
Further,  initial  repurchase  firms  present  ex-ante  higher  cash  balances,  options  and  stock 
returns and ex-post higher non-operating income and retained earnings. We show that there is 
almost no difference in terms of the dividend behavior of initial repurchase firms relative to 
non-repurchase firms. Our results also suggest that initial repurchase firms (in comparison 
with non-repurchase firms) seem to have financial characteristics similar to those of dividend 
initiators (relative to matched dividend postpone firms), as reported by Kale et al., (2006) and 
Bulan et al., (2006). This is an unexpected result for us, because most empirical literature find 
that  dividends  tend  to  be  “sticky”,  whereas  the  same  is  not  valid  for  stock  repurchases. 
Further,  our  empirical  findings  in  the  two  multivariate  empirical  approaches  used  are 
particularly  consistent  with  the  equity  timing  and  undervaluation  signaling  hypotheses  in 
explaining the timing of stock repurchases (consistent with the results of Jagannathan and 
Stephens (2003) for the likelihood of less frequent stock repurchases). We also offer some 
support for the risk reduction signaling, free cash flow and maturity hypotheses for initial 
repurchase firms which are also dividend payers. For all other theoretical hypotheses, the 
results are somewhat different for the two approaches used. The logistic regression supports  
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the free cash flow, the timing, the (leverage) tax rate differential and the maturity (only for 
dividend payers) hypotheses. Among those, the duration analysis offers evidence consistent 
only  with  the  free  cash  flow  and  the  maturity  hypotheses  for  dividend  payers.  Both 
approaches do not show any evidence in support of the dividend substitution and options and 
dilution hypotheses. We note that all hazard models employed have consistent results and the 
same occurs for the logistic regressions using panel and non-panel regression techniques.  
This study makes a number of contributions relative to previous empirical studies. 
First, this is the first study we are aware of that attempts to explain the timing of the initial 
repurchase decision. While considerable attention has been devoted in the financial literature 
to related subjects, such as dividend initiations or stock repurchases in general, surprisingly 
little consideration has been given to a firm’s decision to repurchase its own stock for the first 
time. Second, it uses panel data techniques in the logistic regressions, which is not usual in 
most published papers so far. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief 
review of the related literature. Section 3 present our hypotheses and empirical predictions. 
Section  4  provides  information  about  data,  sample  selection  and  the  methodology  used. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results and section 6 provides the conclusions. 
 
 




The  absence  of  any  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  ﬁrms’  decision  to  first 
repurchase their stock stands in sharp contrast to the strong flow of empirical literature on 
stock  repurchases,  especially  since  Dann  (1981)  and  Vermaelen  (1981).  But  even  in  the 
context of dozens or hundreds of papers and working papers on stock repurchases, we were 
not able to find any references to the decision of (re)purchasing stock for the first time. The 
only empirical work we know about initial stock repurchases is an unpublished event study 
from Gesser et al., (2005), with clearly different objectives from this work. They want to test 
the  wealth  effects  related  to  unanticipated  stock  repurchases.  Hence,  they  define  a  stock 
repurchase  as  an  initial  repurchase  when  a  firm  initiates  stock  repurchases  after  four 
consecutive  years  with  no  repurchase  transactions,  arguing  that  in  these  cases  the 
announcement of the stock repurchase should be unanticipated by the market.  
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There has also been a good deal of interest in the literature on the timing of dividend 
initiations (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Michaely et al., 1995; Benartzi et al., 1997; Kale et al., 
2006; Bulan et al., 2006), in contrast to the little, if any, attention that has been devoted to 
ﬁrms’ decision to initiate stock repurchases. To our knowledge, the analysis of the timing of 
initial stock repurchases is also absent from the empirical literature on ﬁrms’ applications of 
cash, despite the attention this literature has devoted to acquisitions (e.g. Harford, 1999) or 
payments of special dividends (e.g., Howe et al., 1992; Lie, 2000). The perceived flexibility 
of stock repurchases commonly found in management surveys (e.g., Campbell and Graham, 
2001; Brav et al., 2005) is, perhaps, the best explanation for this absence in the financial 
literature:  while  the  perceived  inflexibility  of  dividend  initiations  makes  managers 
particularly averse to initiating dividends, the same would not occur for stock repurchases, in 
view  of  their  (timing  and  magnitude)  flexibility.  This  might  influence  management’s 
perception that the initial stock repurchase would be a “not-so-important transaction” for the 
firms’ future. 
Whatever the reasons may be, so far, there is no integrated theory which provides 
clear insights into the reasons why a particular firm initiates a stock repurchase at a particular 
point in time. For example, it is difficult to predict whether a firm with high information 
asymmetry or with a strong incentive to avoid free cash flow problems may initiate a stock 
repurchase in the current year, the next year or even the year after. Consequently, this study 
attempts  to  fill  this  gap  in  the  literature  by  investigating  the  economic  motivations  and 
theories  that  may  explain  the  timing  of  initial  stock  repurchases.  In  the  next  section,  we 




2.2. (Brief) Review of the Literature on Stock Repurchases in General 
 
Presumably,  the  most  cited  theories  of  stock  repurchases  as  a  whole  are  the 
performance signaling (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985, among others) and free 
cash  flow  agency  costs  theories  (e.g.,  Easterbrook,  1984;  Jensen,  1986)  according  to  the 
Stephens  and  Weisbach  (1998)  and  Dittmar  (2000)  surveys.  These  theories  have  been 
analyzed  extensively  in  the  empirical  literature  on  financial  decisions,  including  stock 
repurchases, because they tend to be consistent with the most pervasive empirical findings. 
However, other theories have been labeled as truly important in explaining stock repurchases,  
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such  as  the  undervaluation  (e.g.,  Asquith  and  Mullins,  1986;  Ikenberry  et  al.,  1995),  the 
maturity  theory  (e.g.,  Grullon  et  al.,  2002),  the  risk  signaling  theory  (e.g.,  Grullon  and 
Michaely,  2004;  Lie,  2005),  the  dividend  substitution  hypothesis  theory  (e.g.,  Fama  and 
French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002) and the equity timing theory (e.g., Baker and 
Wurgler,  2002).  Several  empirical  studies  test  the  differential  tax  theory,  related  to  both 
leverage and payout dimensions of stock repurchases (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1988; Dittmar, 
2000).  Finally,  the  options  and  earnings  dilution  hypothesis  may  be  put  forth  here  as  an 
explanation for stock repurchases (e.g., Jolls, 1998; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002). 
These theoretical explanations are consistent with several economic motivations (not 
mutually exclusive) that are usually found in the financial literature, including the existence 
of lower than target debt ratios (e.g., Bagwel and Shoven, 1988; Opler and Titman, 1996; 
Dittmar,  2000),  the  distribution  of  excess  cash  balances  (e.g.,  Guay  and  Harford,  2000; 
Jaganathan et al., 2000), the flexibility in distributing payouts (e.g., Jagannathan et al., 2000; 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002), a mechanism for takeover defense (e.g., Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 
1991) and for inside trading (e.g., Fried, 2001), several market microstructure effects (e.g., 
Brockman and Chung, 2001; Cook et al., 2003) and managing earnings per share objectives 
(e.g., Badrinath and Varaya, 2000; Bens et al., 2002), among other plausible motivations. In 
fact,  it  is  quite  likely  that  multiple  objectives  are  contemporaneously  driving  managers’ 
decisions for repurchasing their own stock,  resulting from the  fact that stock repurchases 
simultaneously influence the capital and ownership structures, and financial policies related to 
incentive compensation, investment, financing and stockholder remuneration. Dittmar (2000) 
provides a detailed empirical test of these competing explanations and finds support for some 
of these explanations at different points in time. More recently, Dittmar and Dittmar (2007) 
argue that the main force that drives the timing of the aggregate value of stock repurchases is 
the business cycle. 
 
 
2.3. Review of the Literature on Dividend Initiations 
 
Studies of dividend initiations are relatively few compared to those on the broader 
category of dividend increases. In the 19-eighties, Asquith and Mullins (1983), Healy and 
Palepu  (1988),  Venkatesh  (1989),  among  others,  studied  the  signaling  role  of  dividend 
initiations. The most common result of these studies was evidence in support of the signaling 
effects on both future operating performance improvements and higher future stock returns.  
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These empirical results were grounded in theoretical models of Bhattachayra (1979) and John 
and Williams (1985). Later, studies by Lang and Lintzenberger (1989) and Smith and Watts 
(1992) found evidence  consistent with the free cash flow theory of Easterbrook (1984) and 
Jensen (1986), but the signaling role was still the most important explanation for dividend 
initiations  (John  and  Lang,  1991;  Michaely  et  al.,  1995;  Lipson  et  al.,  1998).  However, 
Grullon et al., (2002) challenged the crucial importance of operating performance signaling in 
explaining dividend initiations, when they proposed the maturity or life cycle hypothesis, 
which predicts that firms will pay dividends upon reaching the mature stage of their life cycle 
(although they did not separate the impact of dividend initiations in their empirical study). 
Baker and Wurgler (2004 and 2004a) also show the importance of the catering theory (a 
different explanation but very close to the dividend clientele effect of Bajaj and Vijh, 1990), 
which predicts that firms will change their payouts in response to investors’ preferences for 
dividend paying stocks and the correspondent market dividend premium (i.e., the difference 
in market price that investors are willing to pay for firms that distribute cash dividends). In 
this  context,  Bulan  et  al.,  (2006)  find  empirical  support  for  the  latter  two  theoretical 
hypotheses, while they find no evidence for the signaling role of dividend initiations. On the 
contrary, while also using the most recent and robust empirical methodologies, Kale et al., 
(2006) find support for the most common theoretical explanations of dividend initiations but 
they argue that the most pervasive findings are in support of the dividend signaling models of 
John and Williams (1985) and Allen et al., (2000).  
 
 




The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  determine  what  the  existing  theories  of  stock 
repurchases imply specifically for the timing of the initial repurchases decision. Our primary 
research question is about providing insights into why firms first repurchase their own stock 
at a particular point in time. We start by examining several alternative theoretical hypotheses 
and economic motivations that the financial literature has found to be able to explain the stock 
repurchase decision as an alternative mechanism for distributing cash flow. We must do this, 
because the literature so far provides no specific theory to indicate when a firm will initiate 
stock repurchase transactions for the first time. In this study, we try to fill this gap in the  
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literature  by  focusing  on  explaining  the  timing  of  initial  repurchases.  Since  most  of  the 
theoretical models of stock repurchases have very little to say about the timing of the initial 
stock repurchase decision, with the exceptions noted in the discussion below, the predicted 
relation between these variables and the timing of an initial stock repurchases is the same as 
the likelihood of an initial stock repurchase.  
 
 
3.2. Hypothesis About Determinants of the Timing of Initial Repurchases 
 
The several theoretical hypotheses briefly presented in the last section make a number 
of testable  empirical predictions regarding the likelihood of stock repurchases in general and, 
although they have no such predictions for initial repurchases, we are going to apply them 
here to the timing of initial stock repurchases. Since most of the theoretical models of stock 
repurchases have very little to say about the timing of the initial stock repurchase decision, 
the predicted relation between these variables and the timing of initial stock repurchases are 
mostly the same as for the likelihood of initial stock repurchases (see chapter 2). The duration 
analysis should confirm the main hypothesis mentioned above and, by including the time 
dimension in the context of a firm’s life cycle, should present new evidence supporting the 
potential uniqueness of initial repurchases. In particular, the maturity hypothesis posits that 
we should observe large cash accumulations, declines in growth, capital expenditures and risk 
for firms that have transitioned from the growth phase to the low growth phase. It is in this 
low growth phase of a firm’s life cycle that it should decide to repurchase, whereas we expect 
that won’t be true for initial repurchases. Therefore, initial repurchase firms might be at a 
lifecycle stage at which they grow at high rates and still rely on external capital and are not 
yet self-financing (as other repurchase firms plausibly are). 
 
3.2.1. Performance Signaling Hypothesis 
 
The performance signaling theory assigns an information role to stock repurchases and 
posits  that  firms  will  repurchase  their  stock  when  they  have  good  prospects  of  future 
operating  performance  (e.g.,  Bhattacharya,  1979;  Miller  and  Rock,  1985).  This  theory 
suggests  that  firms  which  expect  performance  improvements  in  the  future,  would  initiate 
stock  repurchases  earlier  than  firms  without  these  characteristics.  Also,  according  to  the 
performance signaling hypothesis, as stock repurchases convey information to the market,  
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initial  repurchase  firms  are  expected  to  have  relatively  higher  levels  of  asymmetric 
information.  Consequently,  we  should  expect  that  smaller  size  firms  that  present  higher 
growth and operating volatility may repurchase earlier.  
In addition to performance improvements related to the magnitude of operating profits 
or  cash  flows,  performance  signaling  may  also  be  linked  to  the  information  content  of 
decreases in operating risk (Grullon and Michaely, 2004;  Lie, 2005).  With regard to this 
hypothesis,  we  should  expect  that  firms  with  higher  operating  risk  would  initiate  stock 
repurchases earlier. 
 
3.2.2.Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis 
  
It is very well documented in the literature that the amount of information available 
and the degree of accuracy of the market valuation of a firm may affect its stock repurchase 
decisions (see stock repurchase surveys such as Dittmar, 2000; Weston and Siu, 2002). One 
potential  indication  of  undervaluation  is  a  history  of  low  returns.  If  the  undervaluation 
signaling hypothesis drives the timing of initial stock repurchases, then we expect to find that 
firms initiate stock repurchases after periods of low returns and that these transactions should 
be followed by high future returns. The assumption here is that low past returns indicate 
relatively low past valuations and that high future returns represent a market correction of 
past undervaluation (as the market investors realize that managers are seeking to repurchase 
stock to take advantage of this potential undervaluation in the stock price). Dittmar (2000) 
argues that since historical returns are a backward-looking measure of valuation, they may not 
detect current undervaluation. Also, Ikenberry et al., (1995) show that firms with low market-
to-book  ratios  earn  abnormal  returns  in  subsequent  periods,  meaning  that  market-to-book 
ratios may indicate undervaluation. Therefore, we also posit that firms with lower market-to-
book ratios should also have a higher likelihood of earlier initial stock repurchases. Finally, as 
stock repurchases convey information to the market, firms with relatively higher levels of 
asymmetric  information  and,  hence,  lower  size,  should  also  have  a  higher  likelihood  to 
initiate stock repurchases earlier. 
 
3.2.3. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
The  free  cash  flow  theory  states  that  low  growth  firms  with  limited  investment 
opportunities  are  more  likely  to  have  higher  free  cash  flows  and,  therefore,  incur  higher  
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equity agency costs because managers of those firms have the incentive to invest in value-
destroying  assets  and  activities  (Easterbrook,  1984;  Jensen,  1986).  This  agency  theoretic 
framework  predicts  that  managers  can  commit  themselves  to  minimizing  those  wasteful 
expenditures by adopting a policy of distributing excess free cash flows, for instance through 
stock repurchases. Apparently, the free cash flow theory makes similar predictions for initial 
and other stock repurchase transactions. In fact, the predictions for the likelihood of stock 
repurchase decisions are that they are negatively related to the firms’ future growth options 
and discretionary  expenditures and positively  related to the existing amount of cash (and 
negatively related to leverage), cash flows and profitability. We argue, however, that this may 
well be the case for stock repurchase transactions in general but not necessarily for initial 
repurchases. Thus, firms with lower growth options and discretionary expenditures should not 
necessarily be more likely to initiate repurchases earlier. On the contrary, we should expect 
that initial repurchase firms may be high growth firms which are more likely to suffer from 
information asymmetry due to uncertainty about future growth, rather than from free cash 
flow problems. 
 
3.2.4. Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
 
Some literature documents that dividends are used to distribute permanent cash flows 
while stock repurchases are used to distribute transitory cash flows, as is the case of non-
operating cash flows (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000). Stock repurchases 
should play an important restructuring role by enabling management to distribute cash in a 
timely  manner.  Therefore,  we  should  expect  a  negative  relation  between  non-operating 
income and the duration of initial stock repurchases.  
The  financial  flexibility  question  that  drives  most  of  the  dividends-repurchases 
substitution debate is not only related to the degree of predictability of cash flow but also with 
the number of future investment opportunities and the magnitude of operating and financial 
risk.  Firms  with  higher  growth  options  face  not  only  more  profitable  investment 
opportunities,  but  also  greater  uncertainty  about  the  level  of  profitable  investment 
opportunities, and hence they should rely more on stock repurchases rather than dividends to 
distribute cash to stockholders, if they do so, because in this case firms may require a more 
flexible payout policy. Also, higher volatility of operating income should reduce dividends 
and significantly increase the mix of cash flow distributions made through stock repurchases. 
We hypothesize that these relations will hold for initial repurchases. This prediction means  
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that higher growth and operating risk attributes will increase the likelihood of initial stock 
repurchases, in particular for the sample of non-dividend payers. This prediction supports the 
Fama and French (2001) view that the lower propensity to pay dividends is a characteristic of 
younger, smaller firms, with higher rates of capital and R&D expenditures, that do not pay 
dividends but which may repurchase their stock. Hence, this will be consistent with a lower 
substitution effect between dividends and stock repurchases for initial repurchase firms. 
 
3.2.5. Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis 
 
Stock repurchases may also be preferred over dividends as a mechanism of cash flow 
distribution due to the personal tax rate advantage of capital gains (Copeland and Weston, 
1988).  If  initiating  stock  repurchases  is  an  alternative  to  cash  dividends  distribution,  we 
should expect that stock repurchases should be negatively related to dividend payout ratios. 
Also, stock repurchases reduce equity and increase debt ratios or reduce cash levels. These 
two latter effects reduce the tax burden of repurchase firms. Therefore, we expect that firms 
with lower debt ratios and lower payout ratios may repurchase earlier.  
 
3.2.6. Maturity Hypothesis 
 
The maturity hypothesis predicts that firms will repurchase their stock upon reaching 
the  mature  stage  of  their  life  cycle,  when  they  are  faced  with  high  cash  flows  and  low 
investment  opportunities  (Grullon  et  al.,  2002).  This  hypothesis  implies  that  stock 
repurchases  are  associated  with  subsequent  declines  in  growth  and  operating  risk  and 
increases  in  profitability,  operating  cash  flow  and  cash  balances.  In  this  context,  our 
hypothesis about the potential uniqueness of initial stock repurchases may have a special 
opportunity to be tested. Indeed, we anticipate that the maturity characteristic associated with 
stock repurchases is not valid for initial repurchases but only applies to subsequent repurchase 
transactions. We believe stock repurchases only become a regular event when firms reach 
maturity (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). We will also test the lifecycle theory by using the 
variable used by DeAngelo et al., (2005) in analyzing the maturity hypothesis for dividends 
payers (the mix of earned-contributed capital) to assess whether firms with relatively higher 
retained earnings as a proportion of total assets are more likely to repurchase stock for the 
first time earlier. Finally, we test whether age impacts the duration of initial repurchases. 
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3.2.7. Timing Hypothesis 
 
According  to  this  hypothesis  managers  attempt  to  time  the  market  when  making 
financial decisions, such as to issue securities and distribute cash flows (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002).  Therefore,  firms  will  tend  to  repurchase  stock  (increase  leverage)  when  market 
valuations are at low levels (and to raise equity capital when market valuations are at high 
levels). In reality, if this market timing theory holds, we should expect that low prior stock 
returns, market-to-book ratios and debt ratios may reduce the time to initial repurchases.  
 
3.2.8. Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Financial literature observes that managers have incentives to avoid earnings dilution 
and to report earnings disappointments and hence they make decisions to preserve their firms’ 
reported earnings per share and stock prices (Jolls, 1998, Kahle, 2002). These decisions may 
explain stock repurchase decisions, especially when these managers hold stock options. In this 
context, we should expect that firms with a larger proportion of stock options may repurchase 
more often. However, since we hypothesize that initial repurchases are generally implemented 
by growth firms with high operating risk, it is likely that these firms may have a significant 
number of long term options. These are not likely to be exercised in the short term and stock 
repurchases  may  not  be  necessary  to  remove  the  dilution  effects  of  the  exercise  of  these 
options. Thus, although we expect that initial repurchases may be associated with the use of 
stock options for incentive compensation, using stock repurchases to avoid dilution is less 
likely to occur for firms with high growth in earnings per share, as may be the case of initial 
repurchase firms. In other words, if we are right, we anticipate that the magnitude of options 




To summarize, we expect that initial repurchases are more likely to be undertaken by 
firms that have a potentially high degree of asymmetric information and are willing to signal 
to  the  market  their  potential  undervaluation  or  operating  performance  improvements. 
Therefore, we shouldn’t find empirical support for some of the plausible explanations for the 
timing of non-initial repurchase transactions, such as the free cash flow hypothesis, maturity 
hypothesis, dividends substitution and options and dilution hypothesis.  We anticipate that  
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other than the signaling hypothesis, the differential tax rates and timing, to be more likely 
determinants for the timing of initial stock repurchases. Table 1 summarizes this section’ 
hypothesis in terms of expected relations between the timing of initial repurchases (in the 
sense  of  hazard  rates,  inverse  of  duration  or  likelihood  of  repurchasing  earlier)  and 
explanatory variables, which will be described in the next chapter. 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
4. 1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
The  data  for  this  study  comes  from  the  Compustat  database  for  the  period  1975 
through 2004, inclusive (henceforth data item shown in parentheses). We used this dataset to 
collect all firms’ financial statement data, stock returns and industry, as defined by their 4-
digit SIC code, and to determine the ﬁrms’ age at time of their initial repurchase.  
In  this  study,  we  analyze  the  timing  of  initial  stock  repurchases  and  empirically 
examine the extent to which firms formulate their initial repurchase decisions according to the 
most frequently mentioned theoretical models of financial policies and decisions. We focus on 
actual stock repurchases by tracking a sample of 1,379 firms which went public after 1975 
and that initiated stock repurchases in the period of 1980-2004. Allen and Michaely (2002) 
and Banyi et al., (2005) evaluate various methods for estimating actual stock repurchases 
figures  and  recommend  a  measure  based  on  the  cash  flow  statement  that  they  name  as 
Compustat purchases of common and preferred stock adjusted for the change in preferred 
stock, and which they consider as the most accurate (or least biased) measure of  the actual 
dollar amount spent on repurchases, particularly for firms with high stock options.
1 We follow 
this approach. Therefore, we identify stock repurchases as the amount of purchase of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat data item #115) minus any reduction in the value (retirement, 
conversion, and/or redemption of preferred stock, Compustat items #56 and #130) of the net 
amount of preferred stock outstanding.
2 
                                                 
1 Also, Grullon-Michaely (2002) compared that measure to the amount of repurchase activity reported by SDC 
(amount of repurchases announced) and found that the correlation coefficient between these two measures is 
0.97 and that the dollar amounts were similar.  
2  The  Compustat  data  item  overstates  open  market  repurchases  of  common  stock  for  a  number  of  reasons 
(Stephens-Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al., 2000). First, it includes repurchases of preferred stock. Second, it 
includes a variety of other transactions such as the conversion of other classes of stock into common stock. In  
- 15 - 
Our analysis of initial repurchases is conducted only on firms listed on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ that also conducted an IPO during the period of our investigation. We argue 
that using only observations of initial repurchasers with an IPO date after 1975 as the basis for 
this study allows us a better understanding of the motives and timing for initial repurchase 
decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) define the IPO year as the first year in which Compustat 
provides data to the market. We begin by identifying firms on Compustat that repurchased 
their stock for the first time during the period 1980-2004 (henceforth, initial repurchase firms 
are “initial repurchasers”). An initial repurchase is defined as the first repurchase that a firm 
makes since its IPO. We will assume that the IPO year is the year that the firm had a positive 
stock price on Compustat (as Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Lemmon and Zender, 2003 and Bulan 
et al., 2006). We follow previous literature when we further  restrict the sample to initial 
repurchases  that  represent  more  than  one  million  US  dollars.  Also,  in  line  with  previous 
studies, we truncate all variables at the top and bottom one percentiles and we exclude those 
firms  for  which  several  relevant  variables  from  our  analysis  were  missing.  We  further 
excluded financial companies and utilities (SIC codes 4813, 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) from 
our sample. These criteria identify our sample of 1,379 observations of initial repurchases 
collected  for  the  period  1980-2004  from  the  Compustat  database.  We  obtain  the  annual 






To study the determinants of initial stock repurchases, we will perform univariate and 
multivariate empirical analysis of the timing of initial repurchases using a set of variables that 
the literature has identified as important in explaining any stock repurchase decisions. These 
variables are proxies for several firm characteristics that have been shown to be correlated 
with  stock  repurchases.  Dittmar  (2000),  Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002),  Jagannathan  and 
Stephens (2003), among others, document that firms’ size, payout, industry, operating risk, 
leverage, cash balances, cash flow, growth options, earnings and sales growth, profitability, 
non-operating income, underpricing, stock returns, total retained earnings, amount of stock 
options and ownership structure, all help explain the probability of a certain firm repurchasing 
                                                                                                                                                          
some cases Compustat data item #115 corresponds to repurchases net of equity issuance, which Compustat 
indicates with a combined figure code. We treat such observations as missing values.  
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its  own  stock.  We  use  these  same  variables,  with  the  exception  of  ownership  structure 
variables because the databases that include those variables were unavailable to us. In the 
univariate analysis, we use three-year averages for all variables (unless otherwise noted) as in 
Jagannathan  et  al.,  (2000),  either  because  it  is  possible  that  firms  would  initiate  stock 
repurchases in response to cumulative performance, liquidity and risk from the previous years 
and also in order to reduce noise induced by year-to-year variations in many of the variables. 
That is, average values for years –3 through –1 relative to the initial repurchase year are used 
for variables prior to the initial repurchase year and average values for years 0 through +2 
relative to the initial repurchase year are used for the variables subsequent to the repurchase 
initiation.  In  this  context,  the  sample  for  our  univariate  analysis  is  limited  to  the  period 
between  1980  to  2002  to  allow  for  measurement  of  prior  and  subsequent  variables.  In 
contrast, when used in the multivariate analysis, all independent variables are lagged by one 
year, to mitigate any potential endogeneity problems (e.g., leverage, cash, total assets, equity). 
All  variables’  absolute  values  are  scaled  by  total  assets  (#6),  unless  otherwise  stated,  to 
control for scale effects and mitigate heteroskedasticity. Table 2 presents a synthesis of the 





The  main  goal  of  this  study  is  to  explain  the  timing  of  initial  repurchases,  by 
investigating  the  economic  characteristics  of  firms  that  influence  this  decision  and  their 
evolution over time, using a panel analysis framework. In addition to univariate analysis, we 
perform multivariate logit regressions (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; for a more detailed 
discussion on applying logistic regressions) and duration-type regressions (in this case, we 
apply a proportional hazard model) on the panel data to estimate the probability (hazard rate) 
that a firm will repurchase its stock for the first time as a function of several firm attributes 
relative  to  other  firms  that  are  in  the  same  stage  of  their  life  cycle  (see  Alison,  2000; 
Wooldridge, 2002; for a more detailed discussion on applying duration and hazard models).
3 
The hazard model allows us to introduce the time dimension in the context of a firm’s life 
cycle, providing us with the possibility of being able to track the non-repurchases over their 
life cycle until the moment they first repurchase their stock. To complement this analysis in 
                                                 
3 In all cases, we used robust variance-covariance matrix estimators to account for possible heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation in the panel data.  
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the panel data, we also conduct a logit analysis of the repurchase-or-postpone decision, using 
panel data techniques that allow to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, in order to find 
more insights about the initial repurchase decision. We believe that those two quantitative 
approaches  should  give  us  a  better  understanding  of  the  timing  of  the  initial  repurchase 
decision.  
First,  we  use  a  fixed-effects  logit  model  (with  panel  adjustments  to  neutralize  the 
unobserved  firm  heterogeneity)  to  determine  whether  it  is  possible  to  establish  some 
observable criteria for the decision to “repurchase or to postpone”, considering that, in each 
year since the IPO, firms made the decision as to whether to repurchase in that year or not.
4 
As in Kale et al., (2006), the dependent variable is constructed as follows. Those firms that 
initiated repurchases in the year after the IPO (year 1) have one as a dependent variable and 
the others have a value of 0. Of the firms with 0 in the previous year, those that are initial 
repurchase firms in the following year are assigned with a value of 1 and the remaining with 
0. The former ones leave the sample for all subsequent periods. This process is conducted for 
all the years under investigation until the year 2004 is reached. If a firm is not an initial 
repurchase firm until 2004, we classify it as non-repurchaser in each year after its IPO and as 
an initial repurchaser in 2004. Each firm has a value of one in the year it repurchases its stock 
for  the  first  time  and  is  a  non-repurchase  firm  in  all  preceding  years.  Finally,  an  initial 
repurchase firm does not reappear in the sample after the year of initiation. This specification 
allows us to investigate the decision to initiate a repurchase transaction or to postpone it. 
To study the timing of initial repurchases and, in particular, to investigate the impact 
of  several  explanatory  variables  on  this  decision,  the  natural  method  to  use  is  duration 
analysis.  This  empirical  methodology  will  shed  some  light  on  the  timing  of  initial 
repurchases, since it provides a way of introducing the time dimension into the analysis by 
comparing firms of the same age (since their IPO). Following Hale and Santos (2004), Bulan 
et al., (2006), among others, we estimate the following Cox-proportional hazard model:  
 
Pr(IRit =1/IRix =0,"x <t) =exp(Xitb)h0(t) 
 
This time, the dependent variable equals one when the firm is an initial repurchaser at 
period  t  (number  of  years  after  its  IPO  or  “survival  time”,  not  calendar  time)  and  zero 
                                                 
4 We repeated our calculations using a random-effects logit and probit models but we did not reach convergence 
in both cases. Therefore, we were unable to perform Hausman tests to analyze which model would provide the 
best fit.  
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otherwise, X is a vector of time varying firm characteristics, b is a vector of coefficients, and 
h0 is the baseline hazard function to be estimated. That is, each firm is assumed to be “born” 
at time 0 and ages by one year for every subsequent calendar year. In our case, the “failure” 
event is the initial repurchase by a firm and the “exposure time” is the age of the ﬁrm on that 
date, the final period of our analysis if the firm is a non-repurchaser or on the date the firm 
ceased to exist if this occurred prior to the date of its ﬁrst repurchase. The hazard rate h(t) is, 
therefore, a ﬁrm’s probability of repurchasing its stock in a given year t, conditional on the 
fact that it did not repurchase its stock in the previous year t-1. Once the ﬁrm has repurchased 
its stock, it exits the sample. We examine whether there are any significant changes that occur 
along the life cycle of the firm that culminate in the first repurchase. We thus estimate the 
propensity of firms to first repurchase their stock as a function of a set X of time-varying 
explanatory and control variables for firms that are in the same stage in their life cycle. We 
consider the values of these variables for each year and firm from its first appearance in 





5.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
We  begin  our  empirical  analysis  by  analyzing  the  differences  between  initial 
repurchase firms and those firms similar in industry and size that never engaged in any stock 
repurchase transactions (non-repurchase firms) that went public between 1975 and 2002. We 
use only a sub-sample of initial repurchase firms, which we consider representative of the full 
sample of 1,379 initial repurchase firms that we will use in the multivariate analysis, that have 
a matched-sample of non-repurchase firms (see chapter 2). The final sample consists of 1,204 
industrial companies (i.e., excluding utilities and financial firms) listed on the NASDAQ, 
NYSE  and  AMEX.  Of  those,  630  initial  repurchase  firms  were  matched  with  630  non-
repurchase firms similar in size (differences lower than 25% of total assets) and industry 
(four-to-two digits of SIC Codes).  
As presented in tables 3A and 3B, firms that repurchase their stock for the first time 
do so on average 5.5 to 5.6 years after the IPO (median of 4 years), without any noticeable 
differences across the two samples. The non-repurchase firms are older, on average, but have 
the same median age. Finally, we document that 83.5% of those transactions occurred within  
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10  years  following  the  IPO.  We  begin  our  matched  sample  analysis  by  comparing  some 
descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables across the three sub-samples (a sample of 
event firms relative to their matched control firms), reported in Tables 3C to 3F. These tables 
show that there are significant differences between the sample of initial repurchase firms and 
both control samples. In table 3C we compare ex-ante descriptive statistics. In order to reduce 
noise  induced  by  year-to-year  variations  in  many  of  the  variables,  these  statistics  are 
calculations based on three year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -
1). In Table 3D we repeat the same analysis using ex-post values, meaning that calculations 
are based on three year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). 
These  time  windows  follow  the  work  of  Jagannathan  et  al.,  (2000)  and  Jagannathan  and 
Stephens (2003). In table 3E, we compare ex-post values with ex-ante values to preview some 
evolutionary trends with economic meaning. Finally, in table 3F we analyze the differences in 
dividend characteristics between the two matched samples. 
First, in relation to non-repurchase firms, initial repurchase firms have significantly 
higher operating cash flows, market-to-book ratios and profitability, both prior to and after the 
initial repurchase transaction. Initial repurchases are also made by firms with lower leverage 
and operating risk, on average, before and after the initial repurchase event. There are no 
major  differences  in  terms  of  capital  and  other  discretionary  expenses,  retained  earnings 
(those variables have lower average values but higher or similar median values), and earnings 
per  share  and  sales  growth  in  relation  to  their  non-repurchase  peers.
5  Further,  initial 
repurchase firms present ex-ante higher cash balances, options and stock returns and ex-post 
higher non-operating income and retained earnings.  
The  ex-post  versus  ex-ante  differences  between  the  two  control  groups  follow  a 
similar trend. In particular, both samples present increases in leverage and decreases in cash 
flow,  market-to-book  ratios,  capital  and  other  discretionary  expenses,  sales  growth  and 
profitability. In addition, we notice that the non-repurchase firms median values remain lower 
than their initial repurchase counterparts but in almost all variables the net effects indicate a 
trend  towards  convergence.  The  only  exceptions  are  leverage  and  operating  risk.  In  both 
cases, the difference increases for non-repurchase firms. In fact, the stock returns for initial 
repurchase firms actually decreases, while the opposite occurs for non-repurchase firms.  
Finally, in table 3F we see that there is almost no difference in terms of dividend 
characteristics of initial repurchase firms relative to non-repurchase firms. 
                                                 
5 As expected, the matched-pairs analysis tends to neutralize the growth options impact on stock repurchases but 
the same is not achieved for the operating risk variable.  
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Our results suggest that initial repurchasers (in comparison with non-repurchase firms) 
seem  to  have  similar  financial  characteristics  to  dividend  initiators  (relative  to  matched 
dividend postpone firms), as reported by Kale et al., (2006) and Bulan et al., (2006), which is 
an unanticipated result. In particular, Kale et al., (2006) and Bulan et al., (2006) report that 
dividend initiators tend to have higher operating returns and cash reserves and lower leverage 
and  operating  risk.  Bulan  et  al.,  (2006)  also  document  no  significant  improvements  in 
profitability and growth. However, the only “different” result found is also important: they 
both find that dividend initiators have lower growth, whereas we find no significant changes 
in  growth.  Of  course  these  are  only  a  few  attributes,  but  this  evidence  is  worthwhile  to 
mention. 
Overall,  these  results  seem  to  support  the  free  cash  flow,  the  maturity,  the  risk 
reduction signaling, and the (leverage induced) differential tax rates theoretical hypotheses 
and both the leverage and cash flow distribution economic motivations in explaining initial 
stock repurchases. We note, however, that the age and retained earnings variables present 
evidence  that  contradict  the  maturity  hypothesis,  which  is  meaningful  because  these  are 
variables that are included specifically to measure the impact of life cycle effects. Also, we 
find only slight support for the options hypothesis. The data does not confirm the dividend 
substitution  hypothesis  in  relation  to  the  role  of  non-operating  cash  flows.  Also,  the 
performance signaling hypothesis is mostly unsupported by the data, as occurs with Bulan et 
al., (2006) and Kale et al., (2006) for dividend initiators and with Grullon and Michaely 
(2002), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), among others, for stock repurchases. Finally, the 
consistently higher market-to-book ratios of initial repurchase firms (and the similar values 
for previous stock returns) do not provide support for the undervaluation-signaling and the 
timing theoretical explanations of stock repurchases. Thus, they neither confirm Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan et al., (2000), among others, nor the main motivations for 
repurchases by infrequent repurchasers, as documented by Jagannathan and Stephens (2003).  
 
 




Next, we examine the timing of initial repurchases along a firm’s life cycle by using 
logistic and duration models in a comprehensive panel of 1,379 initial repurchases made  
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between  1980  and  2004.  In  the  last  chapter,  we  focused  on  cross-sectional  logistic 
regressions for multivariate comparisons between initial repurchase firms and two matched 
samples of non-repurchase firms and secondary repurchase firms.
6 Although the technique 
of  comparing  initial  repurchase  firms  with  matched  samples  may  allow  investigation  of 
whether initial repurchase firms have systematic differences from other firms with similar 
attributes in terms of size and industry, other interesting findings may arise when analyzing 
changes in the propensity for firms to start repurchasing stock as they go public and continue 
through their life cycle and become more mature.  
 




First, we examine the decision to repurchase or to postpone in order to obtain insights 
into our research question: to better understand the timing of the initial repurchase decision. 
In this analysis, we focus only on the sample of initial repurchase firms that went public over 
the  1980-2004  period  and  attempt  to  determine  whether  it  is  possible  to  establish  some 
observable criteria for the “repurchase or postpone” decision, considering that, in each year 
since the IPO, firms made the decision as to whether to repurchase in that year or not. As in 
Kale et al., (2006), the dependent variable, PROBINREP, for the logistic regression used to 
investigate this subject is constructed as follows. Those firms that initiated repurchases in the 
year after the IPO (year 1) have one as a dependent variable and the others have a value of 0. 
Of  these  firms  with  0  in  the  previous  year,  those  that  are  initial  repurchase  firms  in  the 
following year are assigned a value of 1 and the remaining with 0. The former ones leave the 
sample for all subsequent periods. Then, this process is conducted for all the years under 
investigation until the year 2004 is reached. If a firm is not an initial repurchase firm until 
2004, we classify it as non-repurchaser in each year after its IPO and as an initial repurchaser 
in 2004. Each firm has a value of one in the year it repurchases its stock for the first time and 
is a non-repurchase firm in all preceding years. Finally, an initial repurchase firm does not 
reappear in the sample after the year of initiation. This specification allows us to investigate 
the decision to initiate a repurchase transaction or to postpone it. The sample for the logistic 
                                                 
6 This timing analysis extends the cross-sectional regressions in a natural way and has two advantages. First, it 
introduces the time dimension into the analysis by comparing firms of the same age (since their IPO). Hence we 
include all of a firm’s observations from its IPO until the initial repurchase year. Second, it allows us to test the 
impact of industry and size that have not yet been analyzed in the matched sample approach.  
- 22 - 
regression consists of 8,778 observations, in which 1,379 are initial repurchases and 7,399 are 
“postponer observations”. A positive coefficient in the estimated logistic regressions implies 
that a higher value for the explanatory variable increases the likelihood that the firm will 
initiate repurchases this year, i.e., makes it more likely that the firm will repurchase this year, 
and  vice-versa.  Thus,  our  “repurchase  or  postpone”  analysis  investigates  whether  this 
particular  year  is  the  right  time  to  repurchase  stock  for  the  first  time.  The  results  from 
estimating the logistic regressions are presented in panels 1 (all observations, dividend payers 
and non-dividend payers), 2 (market-to-book quartiles), 3 (size quartiles) and 4 (four time 
period windows) of Table 4A. 
Overall, our results show that higher values for size and cash flow generally increase 
the probability that the firm will initiate stock repurchases rather than postpone them in the 
current year. In contrast, the postpone decision is more likely for firms with higher leverage, 
cash, current growth, retained earnings and stock returns and more options. We get mixed 
evidence related to payout and dividend yield, underpricing, future growth, profit, operating 
risk, non-operating income and earnings per share growth. Next, we present tables with the 
logistic regression results, we discuss them and present a comparison with current literature 
on stock repurchases. 
 
5.2.2.2. Performance Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Our  results  do  not  support  the  operating  profitability  improvements  hypothesis  of 
initial stock repurchases (as in Grullon et al., 2002). We find that firms with larger size and 
operating cash flows and lower sales growth are significantly more likely to repurchase than 
to postpone, which does not support this hypothesis, in particular if we consider size as a 
proxy  for  asymmetric  information.  One  piece  of  supportive  evidence,  although  non-
significant, is the negative sign of underpricing (also significant for non-dividend payers) and 
profitability and the positive sign of earnings per share growth. To the contrary, we document 
a negative relation between future growth and the decision to initiate stock repurchases, but 
only  for  dividend  payers.  Furthermore,  we  find  very  weak  support  for  risk  reduction 
signaling,  because  the  operating  risk  variable  is  predominantly  positive  (the  same  result 
appears in Jagannathan et al., 2000), although never significantly. Finally, we do not find any 
important difference in results for the samples of different market-to-book and size quartiles 
and for the different time periods in relation to performance signaling. 
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5.2.2.3. Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence for variables related to the undervaluation signaling hypothesis offer 
some support for this theoretical explanation of initial repurchase timing. We find that the 
likelihood of initial repurchases increases with lower stock returns and market-to-book ratios 
(although not statistically significant for the latter), in particular for the sub-sample of non-
dividend  payers.  This  result  is  consistent  with several  studies  which  document  that  stock 
repurchases follow periods of low returns and are associated with highly positive average 
(abnormal)  returns  (Lie,  2000;  Jagannathan  et  al.,  2000;  Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002). 
However, this result is also at odds with the conclusion of the matched-pairs approach in 
chapter  2,  perhaps  indicating  that  industry  effects  related  to  the  matching  approach  drive 
those results (because we can not find any size effect in the size quartiles analysis). Also, 
again  if  we  consider  size  as  a  proxy  for  asymmetric  information,  the  evidence  shows  a 
significant positive relation between size and initial repurchase likelihood, which goes against 
any signaling hypothesis. 
 
5.2.2.4. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence confirms the hypothesis that firms repurchase their stock for the first 
time in response to potential agency costs induced by free cash flow problems, as the crucial 
variables related to this hypothesis (lower leverage, current and future growth, and higher 
cash flows) have statistical significance with the proper signs. These results are common in 
the literature (e.g., Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Kahle, 2002; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). We 
note that this is true for both dividend and non-dividend payers, suggesting that the latter 
firms may wish to avoid equity agency costs by repurchasing instead of paying dividends, 
while the former ones do both to mitigate free cash flow problems. There is one exception to 
the  overall  support  of  this  hypothesis,  however:  the  sign  of  the  cash  variable  is  always 
negative and significant, which is not a usual attribute of firms that suffer from free cash flow 
problems.  
 
5.2.2.5. Dividends Substitution Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence allows us to conclude that the dividends substitution hypothesis related 
to the use of non-operating income is not confirmed. The coefficient is negative most of the  
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time  and  without  overall  statistical  significance,  although  it  is  negatively  and  statistically 
significant  for  dividend  payers,  in  two  out  of  four  market-to-book  and  size  quartiles. 
Therefore,  the  motivation  for  distributing  transitory  cash  flows,  such  as  non-operating 
income, does not increase the likelihood of initial repurchases. This contradicts the matched-
pairs results and other results of some empirical studies, such as Guay and Harford (2000) and 
Jagannathan et al., (2000) and even reduce the likelihood in the case of dividend payers. The 
other  two  dimensions  in  which  the  substitution  effect  between  dividends  and  stock 
repurchases  may  occur  (high  growth  and  operating  risk)  also  do  not  increase  the  initial 
repurchase likelihood.  However, the samples of dividend payers  and non-dividend payers 
have some different attributes. In particular, the sample of dividend payers presents lower 
future growth. Table 3D shows that only about 15% of these firms decrease their dividends 
(against 26,3% of dividend increases), which suggests that most dividend payers that start to 
repurchase stock do not substitute cash dividends with stock repurchases. Overall, it seems 
that  initial  repurchases  do  not  substitute  for  but  rather  complement  dividends  for  the 
distribution of surplus operating cash flows. 
 
5.2.2.6. Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis 
 
The differential tax rates hypothesis is only partially supported by our findings, in 
particular the leverage motivation for tax reasons. On the contrary, the payout variable is 
never statistically significant with the proper signs. These results are similar to those of the 
matched-pairs analysis and from other empirical studies for stock repurchases, such as those 
of Jagannathan et al., (2000) and Dittmar (2000), which almost always conclude that leverage 
is an important motivation for stock repurchases and that dividend differential tax rates are, at 
most, weak determinants of the stock repurchase behavior of firms. 
 
5.2.2.7. Maturity Hypothesis 
 
The evidence for the maturity hypothesis is, once again, mixed. First, our logistic 
regressions support the maturity hypothesis by documenting significant positive coefficients 
on cash flow and negative coefficients on current growth. Those results are very common in 
the literature on stock repurchases (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002, 
etc). On the other hand, we find a negative relation between retained earnings and cash with 
initial repurchasing activity. The particular result for retained earnings casts doubt on the  
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maturity hypothesis, as did the variable “age” in the matched-pairs analysis, because it is the 
only variable that is there precisely to measure life cycle effects. We document, however, a 
positive relation between retained earnings and the decision to repurchase, and a negative 
relation between future growth and the decision to repurchase for dividend payers. Therefore, 
the maturity hypothesis is mostly supported only for initial repurchase firms which are also 
dividend payers. 
 
5.2.2.8. Timing Hypothesis 
 
Our results clearly support the contention that firms attempt to time the market when 
they repurchase their stock for the first time because all coefficients have the proper signs 
predicted by the timing hypothesis (although the negative sign of the underpricing variable is 
not statistically significant). These results are specially significant for non-dividend payers, 
suggesting that those firms choose to distribute cash flow by repurchasing stock in order to 
take advantage of previous low stock returns and market-to-book ratios. Similar results are 
common in the literature on stock repurchases, in particular prior market underperformance 
(e.g., Stephens-Weisbach, 1998, Jagannathan et al, 2000) and lower market-to-book ratios 
(e.g., Dittmar, 2000) but they contradict our matched-pairs findings. Once again, industry 
effects related to the matching approach may have driven these results, since we do not find 
any size effect. 
 
5.2.2.9. Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence clearly does not support the options and dilution hypothesis. Although 
both operating risk and earnings per share growth have some (non-significant) coefficients 
with the same signs predicted by this theory, the options variable coefficients are always 
significant and negative (the opposite sign predicted by the options and dilution hypothesis). 
This evidence is similar to that observed in the matched-pairs approach for initial repurchase 




The analysis in this section yields several interesting results. First, the free cash flow 
theory,  the  undervaluation  signaling,  the  timing  hypothesis,  the  maturity  hypothesis  for  
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dividend payers and the differential tax rates hypothesis related to debt, are the five confirmed 
hypothesized  explanations.  These  results  are  common  in  the  literature,  although  not 
consensual. For example, our results are consistent with some of the findings of Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), Dittmar (2000), Kahle (2002), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Grullon 
and Michaely (2004), among others, but they seem at odds to other studies, such as Fama and 
French (2001) and Lie (2005). In comparison with the previous univariate results and our 
matched-pairs  results  in  chapter  2,  we  note  that  risk  reduction  signaling  is  no  longer 
supported, while the undervaluation signaling and the timing hypothesis now have empirical 
support.  The  explanation  for  these  results  is  twofold.  On  one  hand,  the  matched-pairs 
approach  used  is  based  on  firms  with  similar  size  and  industry  attributes.  However,  our 
evidence  shows  that  size  is  always  significant  and  may  have  a  role  in  explaining  initial 
repurchases, especially in explaining the evidence related to prior negative stock returns and 
higher underpricing. Because of this, we add a size quartile analysis in both the matched-pairs 
and repurchase-or-postpone analyses, by also splitting the samples by size quartiles in order 
to check for differences across quartiles. However, we are unable to find strong differences 
across quartiles. On the other hand, in the repurchase-or-postpone analysis, the operating risk 
is measured by the change in return on assets instead of standard deviation of return on assets 
used in the matched-pairs. This change may have driven the difference in results. To check 
this possibility, as the calculation of (the moving average of) the standard deviation of return 
on assets is no longer possible without the loss of thousands of observations (and hundreds of 
firms), we recalculate the matched-pairs regressions with the new proxy for operating risk. 
Again, the results are essentially the same.  
Second,  there  is  no  supporting  evidence  for  the  role  of  initial  repurchases  as  a 
financial  instrument  for  operating  performance  signaling  and  substituting  cash  dividends 
These are common results, however, in the empirical literature (e.g., Lie and McConnell, 
1998; Grullon et al., 2002). The same conclusions seem to apply to the maturity hypothesis 
for initial repurchase firms which are not dividend payers, because these firms have some 
attributes of mature firms, such as lower current growth and higher operating cash flows, but 
lower values for cash and retained earnings (the latter variable is included to measure firms’ 
maturity according to DeAngelo et al., 2005). In addition, the option and dilution hypothesis 
is strongly rejected, which is not consistent with common findings for stock repurchases in 
general (e.g., Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002). All these results confirm the matched-pairs’ findings 
of chapter 2.  
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Third,  the  strong  and  significant  positive  impact  of  size  in  the  timing  of  initial 
repurchases is very interesting. If one considers size as a proxy for asymmetric information, 
we could argue that this generic result provides some additional support for the rejection of 
the  three  signaling  related  hypotheses  and  could  partially  explain  the  above  mentioned 
differences between the matched-pairs and repurchase-or-postpone analyses. However, the 
additional tests referred below did not confirm this. 
Finally, the variables’ significance (or absence there of) is almost never valid for all 
market-to-book quartiles (only cash flow and size) and for the four time periods (only size), 
but we can not find a pattern which could suggest that a particular theory is (or is not) valid 
for any time periods or market-to-book and size quartiles.  
 
 




In this section we present the results of our duration analysis of the age at which the 
firms in our sample choose to repurchase their own stock for the ﬁrst time. We used several 
parametric models that assume known distributions for survival rates and hazard functions: 
Cox-Proportional Hazards, Exponential, Weibull and Gompertz distributions. Surprisingly (or 
perhaps not), we found that the results are essentially the same, although the exponential 
hazard  models  display  some  differences  and  present  higher  (Wald)  Chi-Square  for  all 
regressions. Therefore, we choose to use the Cox-proportional hazards model as the base-case 
model because it gives higher values for the Chi-Square statistic (in relation to the other two 
models with absolutely the same results) and it has the advantage of being semi-parametric 
with weaker assumptions (it assumes a parametric form for the effects of the explanatory 
variables  but  it  allows  an  unspecified  form  for  the  underlying  hazard  function).
78 
                                                 
7 The fact that the Cox Proportional Hazard Model does not assume any particular functional form is important 
but the main problem of Cox’s partial likelihood method for the proportional hazard model is that, with time-
varying covariates, it requires the covariates to be strictly exogeneous. Further, there are a number of ways of 
extending  duration  models  to  account  for  unobservable  heterogeneity.  The  non-parametric  approach  of  the 
Kaplan-Meyer estimator is largely immune to the problem, but is also limited in how much information can be 
provided. 
8 Intuition may suggest that the longer a postpone decision persists, the more likely it is that it will end within the 
next year (positive duration dependence). Or it may be the opposite. It seems equally plausible that the longer a 
postpone decision has lasted, the more unlikely it will be for a firm to initiate stock repurchases and, therefore, 
the less likely it is that it will occur in the next year. But as we are unsure whether the data can be characterized 
by positive or negative duration dependence, it is counterproductive to assume a distribution that shows one  
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Simultaneously, to ensure robustness, we will also discuss the exponential model, whenever it 
presents (somewhat) different results.
9 
According  to  the  Cox-proportional  hazards  model,  different  firms  have  hazard 
functions proportional to one another and the ratio of hazard functions with the covariates 
does not vary over time: 
 
hi(t) = h(t;xi) = h0(t)´exp(xi‘b) 
 
Where hi(t) is the hazard function for the firm i and h0(t) is the baseline hazard rate 
when all explanatory variables are ignored.
10 
Therefore,  we  estimate  a  Cox  Proportional  Hazard  Model  to  understand  the 
determinants of the timing of initial repurchases using a sample of all firms that had an IPO in 
1975 or later and that subsequently repurchase their own stock for the first time. In the same 
spirit as the repurchase-or-postpone decision analysis, the Cox proportional hazard model that 
we estimate includes all firm observations until and including the initial repurchase. At any 
given time, the set of firms that have not yet repurchased their stock comprise the hazard set 
over which the likelihood of repurchase initiation is calculated. In order to compare firms at 
the same stage in their life cycle, the model converts calendar time to the time since birth 
(survival time), as in the previous section. This enables us to examine whether there are any 
significant  changes  that  occur  along  the  life  cycle  of  the  firm  that  culminate  in  initial 
repurchase. The main benefit of hazard models over logistic regression models is that they can 
predict whether an event will occur and, at the same time, explicitly model the time it takes to 
reach that outcome (Kale et al., 2006).  
For reading convenience, in all the tables that follow we report coefficients, rather 
than hazard ratios (multiplicative or exponential coefficients), because, as our main interest is 
in the direction of the effects rather than their magnitude, both present the same information. 
In  the  hazard  model,  a  positive  coefficient  indicates  that  an  increase  in  the  independent 
variable associated with this coefficient will lead, ceteris paribus, to a higher hazard, i.e. to an 
increase in the probability of a ﬁrm’s decision to repurchase its stock for the ﬁrst time (which 
                                                                                                                                                          
characteristic or the other over the entire range of time. The hazard function for the exponential distribution is 
constant, those of the Weibull and Gompertz distributions are monotonically increasing or decreasing depending 
on the sign of the coefficient of duration dependence and the hazards. Which among these is likely to be the best 
in any application is uncertain. 
9 In this model, the hazard rate does not vary over time. This is a characteristic of a process that has no memory. 
The conditional probability of a failure event in a given period of time is the same, regardless of when the 
observation is made. 
10 This model does not have a constant term because the baseline hazard is a firm-specific constant.   
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also  means  it  speeds  up  initial  repurchases).  In  other  words,  a  positive  increase  in  the 
independent variable shortens the time until the initial repurchase. The reverse holds true for a 
negative coefficient. Thus, we investigate the impact of the factors identified by the existing 
literature  that  help  explain  a  ﬁrm’  choice  of  repurchasing,  on  the  hazard  of  the  initial 
repurchase transaction. The results from this analysis are reported in five panels of table 4B. 
The  estimated  coefficients  are  reported  in  the  first  column  and  the  resulting  economic 
significance of each dependent variable in the second column.  
The results from the hazard model are similar to those obtained from the repurchase-
or-postpone decision results. However, we find some differences, especially for leverage, cash 
and sales growth (opposite signs with large statistical significance), but also for market-to-
book ratios, which are significant with a negative sign. Therefore, we find similar results for 
most variables. In other words, we find that higher values for factors that imply a higher 
probability of initial repurchase transactions in our earlier logistic regression analysis also 
lead necessarily to a shorter time to repurchase initiation, with the exceptions referred to 
below (four out of fifteen variables).
 11  
Overall, our results show that the initial repurchase hazard rates tends to be higher for 
larger firms, with higher debt ratios, cash balances, and sales growth, and with lower market-
to-book ratios, options usage, retained earnings and stock returns. Hence, firms with these 
attributes have a higher probability of initiating later. However, the results for the exponential 
hazard model show that some other variables may impact the timing of initial repurchases: 
firms with higher earnings per share growth of sales and lower non-operating income seem to 
initiate stock repurchases sooner, while leverage is no longer statistically significant.  
Next, we present our evidence, discuss the results and compare them with the previous 
results of our repurchase-or-postpone decision analysis.
12  
 
5.2.3.2. Performance Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Our results do not fully support the operating profitability improvements hypothesis as 
a theoretical explanation of the timing of initial stock repurchases. We find that larger size 
                                                 
11 Of course, when interpreting the results we present in this section, it is important to keep in mind that ﬁrm’ 
characteristics evolve over time. For example, when our findings show that size of the ﬁrm positively affects the 
hazard rate, it does not only mean that larger ﬁrms repurchase their stock earlier. This could also be interpreted 
in  dynamic  terms,  meaning  that  small  ﬁrms  repurchase  stock  unfrequently,  but  as  they  grow  larger,  the 
probability that they  will repurchase their stock increases, conditional to the  fact that  these  firms  have  not 
repurchased their own stock before. 
12 Note that there is no current literature about the timing of stock repurchases.  
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(eventually  firms  with  lower  asymmetric  information  costs)  speed  up  firms’  initial 
repurchases, which does not support this hypothesis. Some supportive evidence comes from 
the  significantly  positive  coefficient  of  current  growth  and,  most  particularly,  from  the 
negative coefficient related to market-to-book ratio, which suggests that firms may wish to 
convey information to the market with the initial stock repurchase. However, we have no 
evidence that this potential signal is related to improvements in cash flows or profitability. 
Further, we document some support for risk reduction signaling in explaining the timing of 
initial repurchases for dividend payers only, which is unexpected, since the “stickiness” of 
cash dividends should be sufficient for this signaling. Therefore, we conclude that a firm’s 
management may be signaling their stock mispricing. 
Summarizing, the results from duration analysis are slightly more supportive of the 
performance signaling hypothesis than with those of previous analysis, particularly in view of 
the significant negative sign of the market-to-book ratio. But in our opinion we have, at most, 
only weak supporting evidence for the performance signaling hypothesis. This overall result 
is similar to Bernatzi et al., 1997, Grullon et al., (2002), among others, for stock repurchases 
in general. 
 
5.2.3.3. Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence on variables related with the undervaluation signaling hypothesis are 
highly supportive of this initial repurchase timing explanation. We find that the time to initial 
repurchases decreases with lower market-to-book ratios and stock returns and higher size. Of 
those results, only the last result is not consistent with any signaling hypothesis, as long as we 
consider size as a proxy for asymmetric information. The other results are strongly consistent 
with several studies which document that stock repurchases follow periods of low returns and 
that  they  are  associated  with  highly  positive  average  (abnormal)  returns  (Lie,  2000; 
Jagannathan et al., 2000; Kahle, 2002; Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  
 
5.2.3.4.Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
Our  evidence  does  not  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  firms  choose  the  timing  to 
repurchase their stock for the first time in response to potential free cash flow problems, since 
the  crucial  relationship  between  explanatory  variables  related  to  this  hypothesis  and  the 
dependent variable (especially, lower leverage, future growth and higher cash balances) is  
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mixed. On one side, the positive and significant signs for leverage (with the exception of the 
exponential  model)  and  sales  growth  do  not  support  the  free  cash  flow  hypothesis. 
Furthermore, operating cash flows, future growth and earnings per share growth do not have 
any significant effect on the timing of initial stock repurchases. In sum, only the positive sign 
for cash balances favors the free cash flow hypothesis. 
However, this weak and mixed support does not apply directly to the two sub-samples 
of firms that differ in terms of dividend payments. The evidence is somewhat supportive of 
the free cash flow hypothesis for the sub-sample of dividend payers (as it presents lower 
future growth and higher operating cash flows) but the opposite is true for the sub-sample of 
non-dividend payers. This last result suggests that non-dividend payers either do not have 
strong equity agency costs, or that they do not try to mitigate them by repurchasing stock or 
paying dividends. 
Finally, we note that this empirical evidence contradicts our previous results in both 
the matched-pairs analysis (in chapter 2) and the repurchase-or-postpone decision analyses, 
both of which support the free cash flow theory.  
 
5.2.3.5.Dividends Substitution Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence allow us to conclude that the dividends substitution hypothesis related to 
the use of non-operating income is not confirmed because the coefficient is only significantly 
positive for firms in the first size quartile. In addition, this coefficient is actually significant 
and negative in some regressions using the exponential distribution. Therefore, distributing 
transitory cash flows speeds the initial repurchase transaction only for smaller firms, which 
obviously does not agree with the results for the initial repurchase likelihood of the matched-
pairs analysis and the findings of other empirical studies, such as Guay and Harford (2000) 
and Jagannathan et al., (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) for stock repurchases in 
general. The other two dimensions in which the substitution effect between dividends and 
stock repurchases may occur, high growth and operating risk, do not have an impact on the 
timing of initial repurchase occurrence. Finally, we do not confirm the Fama and French 
(2001) findings that stock repurchase firms tend to be smaller in size, since the coefficient of 
size  is  always  significantly  positive.
13  Hence,  the  results  do  not  confirm  the  flexibility 
motivation for initial repurchases and they also do not help us to conclude whether initial 
                                                 
13 Note that this result do not contradict them, either.  
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repurchases either substitute or complement cash dividends for the distribution of surplus 
operating cash flows (as in Dittmar and Dittmar, 2002). 
 
5.2.3.6.Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis 
 
The  differential  tax  rates hypothesis  is  clearly  not  supported  by  our  findings.  The 
payout variable is either not statistically significant or does not have the proper signs. On the 
other hand, leverage coefficients have positive statistical significance, which contradicts the 
leverage differential tax hypothesis and the leverage motivation. This latter result is different 
from those of the matched-pairs analysis and from other empirical studies of the likelihood of 
stock  repurchases,  such  as  Jagannathan  et  al.,  (2000)  and  Dittmar  (2000),  which  almost 
always conclude that leverage is an important motivation for stock repurchases. The former 
results support the claim that dividend differential tax rates are, at best, weak determinants of 




The  evidence  for  the  maturity  hypothesis  is,  once  again,  mixed.  First,  our  hazard 
regressions support the maturity hypothesis by documenting significant positive coefficients 
for cash and operating cash flows for all observations and negative coefficients on future 
growth for dividend payers. However, we find a negative coefficient for retained earnings and 
a positive coefficient for current growth for all observations. These results cast doubt on the 
validity of the maturity hypothesis, especially the results related to retained earnings, which is 
the only variable in the analysis used specifically to measure life cycle effects. However, there 
is some support for the maturity hypothesis for the sub-samples of dividend payers and firms 
in the larger size quartiles, which is an expected result if we believe that dividend payers and 
larger firms tend to be more mature. It also partially confirms the findings of our logistic 




Our results show some evidence to support the idea that firms attempt to time the 
market when they choose the timing of initial repurchasing activity because most coefficients 
are statistically significant, with the proper signs predicted by the timing hypothesis (stock  
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returns and underpricing). Only leverage (in fact the weaker predicted relation of the timing 
theory) presents the opposite sign.  
 
5.2.3.9.Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Again, we find evidence that contradicts the options and dilution hypothesis. Although 
operating  risk  and  earnings  per  share  growth  are  not  significant  coefficients,  the  options 
variable coefficients are always significant and negative, which is the inverse of the result 
predicted  by  the  options  and  dilution  hypothesis.  This  evidence  supports  our  previous 
empirical results with other models and the results of Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) for 




The  results  in  this  section  are  very  similar  to  those  found  in  the  repurchase-or-
postpone logit analysis. This fact is usual on the literature of dividend initiations (Kale et al., 
2006; Bulan et al., 2006). However, although the results of both approaches are similar, some 
differences exist. 
First,  of  the  theories  supported  by  the  repurchase-or-postpone  analysis,  only  the 
undervaluation signaling and the timing hypothesis are fully supported. In contrast, the free 
cash  flow  theory  (especially  for  non-dividend  payers),  the  maturity  hypothesis  (again  in 
particular for non-dividend payers) and the differential tax rates hypothesis related to debt are 
not confirmed by the hazard models. On the other hand, the negative significance of market-
to-book ratios in the hazard models analysis slightly increased the support to the signaling 
hypothesis  as  a  whole.  Furthermore,  we  find  results  consistent  with  the  risk  reduction 
signaling hypothesis for the dividend-payers sub-sample.  
Second, the dividends substitution hypothesis is again not supported. However, this 
analysis does not enable us to reject this theoretical hypothesis, since we do not find growth 
and risk attributes that are necessary to provide us with clearer results. In this context, we 
should stress that the flexibility motivation for stock repurchases is also not supported, nor do 
we find support for the leverage increasing motivation of stock repurchases. 
Third, the options and dilution hypothesis is again rejected as an explanation for the 
timing of initial stock repurchases. This confirms the matched-pairs analysis (in chapter 2)  
- 34 - 
and our previous repurchase-or-postpone logit analysis, but contradicts common findings for 
stock repurchases in general (e.g., Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002). 
Finally, we still have only mixed evidence in favor of the maturity hypothesis, because 
the timing of initial repurchase firms is not determined by some maturity attributes, such as 
lower growth and operating risk, and higher values for retained earnings (a special variable 
included  to  measure  firms’  maturity  according  to  DeAngelo  et  al.,  2005).  However,  the 
positive and significant coefficients for the cash variable (for all observations) and growth 
variable (for dividend payers) provides some support for this hypothesis.  
 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
 
To assess the robustness of our results and to analyze the contradictory results of the 
two  approaches  used,  we  repeated  calculations  using  different  explanatory  variables  and 
model specifications. However, our conclusions are mostly unaffected. In particular, we used 
the same specification for the duration analysis as Bulan et al., (2006), in which we used the 
matched-pairs  data  for  initial  and  non-repurchase  firms  (only  1980-to-2002  observations, 
explanatory  variables  measured  by  three  year  averages  and  including  ex-post  changes  in 
variables) but, once again, the results were  almost the same as the conventional duration 
analysis.  The  new  empirical  evidence  came  from  ex-post  changes  in  variables,  which 
presented evidence in support of the performance signaling hypothesis and the excess cash 
distribution motivation, and against the free cash flow and maturity hypotheses (in particular 
the significant negative changes in cash and positive changes in profitability,  growth and 
operating risk). In this context, the conclusions related to the exponential hazard model were 





In this paper,  we investigate the timing of initial stock repurchase transactions by 
studying the validity of the motivations and theoretical explanations commonly used in the 
literature to explain stock repurchases. We used two distinct approaches. First, we employed a 
panel adjusted logistic approach to analyze the postpone-or-repurchase decision. Second, we 
used the natural approach to study the timing of decisions: the duration or hazard models  
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approach.  In our study, both approaches present similar evidence, although we find some 
differences. In studying a research question similar to ours, Kale et al., (2006) and Bulan et 
al., (2006) apply a similar empirical methodology to analyze dividend initiations, but the 
results of both approaches are almost the same. In our paper, the undervaluation signaling and 
the timing hypotheses are the only two fully supported by both empirical approaches, thus 
confirming the  results of Jagannathan  and Stephens (2003) for less frequent repurchasing 
firms and Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan et al., (2000) and Kahle (2002) for 
stock repurchase firms. Also, the dividends substitution and options and dilution hypotheses 
are not supported by both approaches. The latter result is not common in the literature on 
stock repurchases in general (e.g., Jolls, 1998; Kahle, 2002). There is also some consistency, 
as both approaches give slight support for the risk reduction signaling, free cash flow and 
maturity hypotheses for dividend payers. But for the performance signaling and leverage tax 
rate differential hypotheses the two approaches give different results. We note that all hazard 
models employed have  consistent results and the same occurs for the logistic regressions 
using panel and non-panel regression techniques. In relation to our univariate results, we find 
that  in  relation  to  non-repurchase  firms,  initial repurchase  firms  have  significantly  higher 
operating cash flows, market-to-book ratios and profitability, both prior to and after the initial 
repurchase transaction. Initial repurchases are also made by firms with lower leverage and 
operating  risk,  on  average,  before  and  after  the  initial  repurchase  event.  Further,  initial 
repurchase firms present ex-ante higher cash balances, options and stock returns and ex-post 
higher  non-operating  income  and  retained  earnings.  We  confirm  that  there  is  almost  no 
differences  between  the  dividend  behavior  of  initial  repurchase  firms  relative  to  non-
repurchase firms. Our results also suggest that initial repurchase firms (in comparison with 
non-repurchase  firms)  seem  to  have  financial  characteristics  similar  to  those  of  dividend 
initiators (relative to matched dividend postpone firms), as reported by Kale et al., (2006) and 
Bulan et al., (2006), which is an unexpected result, because most empirical literature find that 
dividends tend to be “sticky”, whereas the same is not true for stock repurchases.  
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Table  1:  Predicted  Relations  of  Independent  Variables  with  the  Timing  of  Initial  Stock 
Repurchases (Hazard rates or increase likelihood of conducting an initial repurchase earlier) 













Maturity  Timing  Options 
and 
Dilution 
SIZE  –  –    –         
PAYOUT        –  –       
LEVERAGE      +    –    –   
CASH      –      – =     
CASHFLOW  –    –      – =     
UNDERP  –  –          –   
GROWTH  +    +  +    + =     
PROFIT  –          – =     
OPRISK  +    +  +    + =    + 
OPTIONS                + = 
NONOPINC        +         
EPSGRW                + 
SALESGRW  +    +      + =     
RETEARN            – =     
STOCKRET    –          –   
 
Signs: Positive relation (+); Negative relation (–); no positive relation (– =); no negative relation (+ =). 
R0: sample of non-repurchase firms; R2: sample of secondary-repurchase firms. 
Note: Predicted relations take into consideration the  hypothesis development in section 3.1. and have  signs 
consistent with the differential strength expected for initial repurchase firms and their matched counterparts. 
Therefore, they may include different signs from conventionally predicted relations in order to account for the 
overall research question related to the uniqueness of initial repurchases. For example, the prediction for the free 
cash flow theory and maturity hypothesis is that they may apply to stock repurchases as a whole but not to initial 
repurchases. Thus the signs are the opposite from the conventional application of this theory.  
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Table 2: Definition and Measurement of Variables 
List of variables used with definition and Compustat code. Data for firms’ characteristics are obtained 
from the Compustat database. 
Variables  Definition  Compustat # 
PROBINREP  1 if the observation is an initial repurchase 
firm and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable 
AGE  Years since first stock market price   
SIZE  Natural log of the book value of assets  ln(#6) 
PAYOUT  Dividend payout ratio  #21/#18 
LEVERAGE  Book value of total debt  (#9+#44)/#6 
CASH  Cash balances   #1/(#6-#1) 
CASHFLOW  Operating cash flow  (#110+#308)/#6 
UNDERP  Equity market-to-book ratio  (#24*#25)/#60 
GROWTH  Capex advertising and R&D  (#128+#45+#46)/#6 
PROFIT  Return on assets  #18/#6 
OPRISK  Operating risk  (#18t-#18t-1/#18t-1) 
OPTIONS  Stock reserved for stock options  #215/#6 
NONOPINC  Non operating income  #61/#6 
EPSGRW  Earnings per share growth  #58(t/t-1)-1 
SALESGRW  Sales growth  #12(t/t-1)-1 
RETEARN  Total retained earnings  #36/#6 
STOCKRET  Stock return  (#24*#25)(t/t-1)-1 
 
 
Table 3A: Length of Time Between IPO and Initial Repurchases (in years) 
Matched Pairs Analysis  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Sub-sample of 630 Initial Repurchase Firms  5.6  4.0  4.4 
Total ample of 1,379 Initial Repurchase Firms  5.5  4.0  4.3 
 
Table 3B: Age of Sample Firms (in years) 
Matched Pairs Analysis  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Initial Repurchase Firms  5.5  4.0  4.3 
Non-Repurchase Firms  7.1  4.0  8.3 
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Table 3C: Ex-Ante Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0). Ex-
ante means that calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -
1). A t-test on differences in means is performed for PAYOUT and OPTIONS. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney 
ranksum test on differences in medians between these two samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. 
The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance 
at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and appendix 1 for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1)  No Repurchases Firms (R0)  Difference 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median   
SIZE  5.230  1.184  4.941  5.150  1.258  4.944   
PAYOUT  0.121  0.648  0.000  0.069  1.387  0.000   
LEVERAGE  0.172  0.179  0.124  0.222  0.238  0.148  *** 
CASH  0.417  0.677  0.167  0.482  1.174  0.124  * 
CASH FLOW  0.097  0.102  0.100  0.054  0.158  0.071  *** 
UNDERP  3.502  4.421  2.498  3.413  6.268  2.054  *** 
GROWTH  0.133  0.096  0.115  0.154  0.146  0.120   
PROFIT  0.052  0.137  0.064  0.000  0.222  0.040  *** 
OPRISK  0.066  0.108  0.035  0.101  0.220  0.039  ** 
OPTIONS  0.042  0.069  0.007  0.041  0.077  0.000  *** 
NONOPINC  0.012  0.028  0.009  0.011  0.019  0.008   
EPSGRW  -0.125  7.426  0.010  0.183  9.160  0.023   
SALESGRW  0.663  7.338  0.251  0.964  3.787  0.264   
RETEARN  0.317  2.348  0.338  0.831  1.536  0.292   
STOCKRET  0.681  4.284  0.182  0.426  1.470  0.043  *** 
 
Table 3D: Ex-Post Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for no-repurchases matched-pairs control firms (R0). Ex-
post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 
to  +2).  A  t-test  on  differences  in  means  is  performed  for  PAYOUT  and  OPTIONS  A  non-parametric 
Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two samples of firms is conducted for all 
other variables. The sign  *** denotes significance at 1%-level,  ** indicates significance at 5%-level and  * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and appendix 1 for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1)  No Repurchases Firms (R0)  Difference 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median   
SIZE  5.866  1.057  5.617  5.830  1.080  5.622   
PAYOUT  0.127  0.672  0.000  0.067  1.420  0.000   
LEVERAGE  0.181  0.172  0.144  0.248  0.270  0.177  *** 
CASH  0.330  0.522  0.121  0.380  0.938  0.106   
CASH FLOW  0.096  0.074  0.092  0.061  0.148  0.070  *** 
UNDERP  2.749  2.358  2.137  2.750  3.639  1.890  *** 
GROWTH  0.122  0.086  0.108  0.129  0.109  0.102   
PROFIT  0.033  0.109  0.047  -0.034  0.269  0.028  *** 
OPRISK  0.066  0.113  0.035  0.122  0.284  0.046  *** 
OPTIONS  0.022  0.044  0.000  0.021  0.051  0.000   
NONOPINC  0.011  0.015  0.008  0.008  0.033  0.006  *** 
EPSGRW  -0.231  1.273  -0.007  -1.034  12.89  0.000   
SALESGRW  0.137  0.841  0.080  0.123  0.312  0.075   
RETEARN  0.449  5.351  0.397  0.552  2.390  0.303  *** 
STOCKRET  0.203  0.561  0.101  0.240  0.738  0.091   
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Table 3E: Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except for PAYOUT and OPTIONS, to which we calculate means. Ex-ante means that variable 
calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). Ex-post 
means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to 
+2).  A  t-test  on  differences  in  means  is  performed  for  PAYOUT  and  OPTIONS.  A  non-parametric 
Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these two samples of firms is conducted for all 
other variables. The sign  *** denotes significance at 1%-level,  ** indicates significance at 5%-level and  * 
denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and appendix 1 for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1)  No Repurchases Firms (R0) 
  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference 
SIZE  4.941  5.617  0.676***  4.944  5.622  0.678*** 
PAYOUT  0.121  0.127  0.006  0.069  0.067  -0.002 
LEVERAGE  0.124  0.144  0.020  0.148  0.177  0.029 
CASH  0.167  0.121  -0.056**  0.124  0.106  -0.018 
CASH FLOW  0.100  0.092  -0.008  0.071  0.070  -0.001 
UNDERP  2.498  2.137  -0.361***  2.054  1.890  -0.164 
GROWTH  0.115  0.108  -0.007*  0.120  0.102  -0.018*** 
PROFIT  0.064  0.047  -0.017***  0.040  0.028  -0.012*** 
OPRISK  0.035  0.035  0.000  0.039  0.046  0.007* 
OPTIONS  0.042  0.022  -0.020***  0.041  0.021  -0.020*** 
NONOPINC  0.009  0.008  -0.001  0.008  0.006  -0.002*** 
EPSGRW  0.010  -0.007  -0.017  0.023  0.000  -0.023*** 
SALESGRW  0.251  0.080  -0.171***  0.264  0.075  -0.179*** 
RETEARN  0.338  0.397  0.059  0.292  0.303  0.011 
STOCKRET  0.182  0.101  -0.081***  0.043  0.091  0.048 
 
Table 3F: Dividend Characteristics of Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
Summary dividend characteristics for event firms (R1) and matched-pairs control firms (R0). See text for details. 
 
Panel 1: Ex-Ante Cash and Ex-post Dividends Characteristics 
  Initial Repurchase Firms (R1)  Non-Repurchase Firms (R0) 
  Ex-ante  Ex-post  Change  Ex-ante  Ex-post  Change 

























Panel 2: Changes in Cash Dividends 
  Initial Repurchase Firms (R1)  Non-Repurchase Firms (R0) 
  n = 1,247  n = 630  n = 782  n = 630 
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Table 4A: Logistic Regressions – Panel 1: All Observations and Dividend Payers and Non-Payers 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions explaining the decision to repurchase or to 
postpone using a sample of initial repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in 
table 2 and in appendix 1 with details.  
Dividend Samples  All Observations 
Payers  Non-Payers 
Variables 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
SIZE  7.275  0.000***  12.06  0.000***  6.611  0.000*** 
PAYOUT  0.175  0.701  0.012  0.803     
LEVERAGE  -4.950  0.000***  -5.454  0.022**  -4.757  0.000*** 
CASH  -0.788  0.004***  -4.3941  0.000***  -0.555  0.034** 
CASH FLOW  3.943  0.000***  8.889  0.002***  3.361  0.000*** 
UNDERP  -0.006  0.272  0.018  0.584  -0.059  0.000*** 
GROWTH  -1.2543  0.233  -5.598  0.061*  -0.193  0.868 
PROFIT  -1.072  0.166  -4.120  0.246  -0.495  0.555 
OPRISK  0.007  0.853  0.015  0.265  -0.008  0.838 
OPTIONS  -11.39  0.000***  -10.24  0.050**  -11.54  0.000*** 
NONOPINC  -3.907  0.331  -9.900  0.031**  2.929  0.637 
EPSGRW  0.004  0.188  0.004  0.674  0.002  0.542 
SALESGRW  -0.111  0.000***  -2.068  0.001***  -0.122  0.000*** 
RETEARN  -0.120  0.005***  0.517  0.023**  -0.202  0.001*** 
STOCKRET  -0.277  0.000***  -0.506  0.048***  -0.188  0.001*** 
McFadden R2    57.67%    60.64%    58.06% 
 
 
Table 4A: Logistic Regressions – Panel 2: Market-to-Book Quartiles 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions explaining the decision to repurchase or to 
postpone using a sample of initial repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in 
table 2 and in appendix 1 with details.  
M-B Quartile 1  M-B Quartile 2  M-B Quartile 3  M-B Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  6.064  0.000***  9.919  0.000***  12.22  0.000***  7.714  0.000*** 
PAYOUT  0.018  0.744  0.089  0.628  -0.297  0.374  -0.854  0.448 
LEVERAGE  -4.643  0.001***  -10.51  0.000***  -12.06  0.000***  -2.828  0.160 
CASH  -0.735  0.296  -2.493  0.001***  -1.807  0.022**  -0.435  0.239 
CASH FLOW  5.580  0.002***  6.048  0.004***  6.326  0.007***  3.665  0.038** 
UNDERP  -0.076  0.143  0.066  0.164  -0.235  0.068*  -0.004  0.537 
GROWTH  0.892  0.638  3.031  0.213  1.588  0.628  -5.093  0.047** 
PROFIT  3.966  0.049**  -1.944  0.046**  -8.644  0.000***  -1.007  0.518 
OPRISK  0.005  0.373  0.027  0.047**  0.023  0.610  -0.010  0.566 
OPTIONS  -11.30  0.001***  -10.13  0.024**  -11.40  0.030**  -13.92  0.055* 
NONOPINC  -20.79  0.005***  -32.97  0.021**  -2.924  0.802  15.68  0.168 
EPSGRW  0.001  0.705  -0.033  0.023**  -0.016  0.645  -0.007  0.623 
SALESGRW  -0.989  0.004***  -3.674  0.000***  -1.032  0.000***  -0.123  0.001*** 
RETEARN  -0.474  0.084  -0.009  0.616  -1.434  0.016**  -0.152  0.025** 
STOCKRET  -0.310  0.021**  -0.271  0.095*  -0.013  0.931  -0.238  0.043** 
McFadden R2    44.68%    69.78%    74.28%    67.22% 
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Table 4A: Logistic Regressions – Panel 3: Size Quartiles 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions explaining the decision to repurchase or to 
postpone using a sample of initial repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in 
table 2 and in appendix 1 with details. 
SIZE Quartile 1  SIZE Quartile 2  SIZE Quartile 3  SIZE Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  20.61  0.000***  9.919  0.000***  6.828  0.000***  5.834  0.000*** 
PAYOUT  1.586  0.020**  0.089  0.628  0.380  0.481  0.014  0.761 
LEVERAGE  -4.595  0.181  -10.51  0.000***  -10.01  0.000***  -1.225  0.433 
CASH  -2.171  0.013**  -2.493  0.001***  -0.248  0.449  -2.020  0.019** 
CASH FLOW  5.389  0.065*  6.048  0.004***  0.691  0.637  9.357  0.000*** 
UNDERP  -0.244  0.000***  0.066  0.164  -0.253  0.000***  0.004  0.979 
GROWTH  -1.669  0.691  3.031  0.213  -0.914  0.730  -2.116  0.402 
PROFIT  -9.248  0.001***  -1.944  0.046**  1.849  0.311  3.077  0.119 
OPRISK  -0.056  0.113  0.027  0.047**  -0.004  0.831  0.007  0.351 
OPTIONS  -13.21  0.042**  -10.13  0.024**  -16.61  0.002***  -18.07  0.002*** 
NONOPINC  42.87  0.071*  -32.97  0.021**  -13.91  0.057*  -4.706  0.255 
EPSGRW  0.006  0.759  -0.033  0.023**  0.034  0.155  0.002  0.702 
SALESGRW  -0.270  0.000***  -3.674  0.000***  -3.433  0.000***  -1.157  0.001*** 
RETEARN  -1.385  0.000***  -0.009  0.616  -0.173  0.033**  -0.257  0.152 
STOCKRET  0.056  0.756  -0.271  0.095*  -0.167  0.362  -0.219  0.091* 
McFadden R2    87.19%    69.78%    62.06%    46.43% 
 
 
Table 4A: Logistic Regressions – Panel 4: Four Time Period Windows 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions explaining the decision to repurchase or to 
postpone using a sample of initial repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in 
table 2 and in appendix 1 with details. 
1982-87  1988-92  1993-97  1998-04  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  6.143  0.077*  11.40  0.000***  10.55  0.000***  5.860  0.000*** 
PAYOUT  -2.927  0.126  0.746  0.315  0.007  0.851  0.068  0.625 
LEVERAGE  -7.273  0.116  -6.192  0.098*  -6.700  0.001***  -4.463  0.000*** 
CASH  -2.405  0.180  -1.839  0.177  -3.836  0.000***  -0.493  0.075* 
CASH FLOW  11.02  0.077*  4.517  0.230  7.900  0.001***  3.100  0.000*** 
UNDERP  -0.213  0.470  0.039  0.589  0.019  0.770  -0.005  0.338 
GROWTH  -1.461  0.602  2.136  0.659  -0.021  0.993  -2.113  0.146 
PROFIT  -17.09  0.065  -4.400  0.381  2.647  0.377  0.135  0.885 
OPRISK  0.115  0.217  0.033  0.193  -0.011  0.257  0.008  0.234 
OPTIONS  15.88  0.078*  14.18  0.169  -15.70  0.000***  -10.27  0.989 
NONOPINC  2.957  0.779  2.715  0.886  -1.275  0.926  -3.112  0.458 
EPSGRW  0.406  0.088*  -0.206  0.377  -0.004  0.762  0.008  0.074* 
SALESGRW  0.745  0.485  -3.393  0.000***  -2.003  0.001***  -0.106  0.000*** 
RETEARN  4.977  0.123  -0.559  0.424  -0.779  0.873  -0.115  0.010** 
STOCKRET  -0.729  0.228  -0.343  0.338  -0.256  0.217  -0.238  0.000*** 
McFadden R2    92.71%    66.66%    72.19%    54.77% 
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Table 4B: Several Probability Distribution Hazard Models – Panel 1: All Observations 
This table presents the signs of the coefficient estimates from several parametric Hazard Models and the semi-parametric 
Cox-Proportional Hazard Models explaining the timing dimension of the initial repurchase decision, using a sample of initial 
repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in table 2 and in appendix 1 with details. 
Variables  Cox Proportional  Exponential  Gompertz  Weibull 
SIZE  +  ***  +  ***  +  ***  +  *** 
PAYOUT  -    -    -    -   
LEVERAGE  +  *  +    +  **  +  ** 
CASH  +  ***  +  ***  +  ***  +  *** 
CASH FLOW  +  **  +  ***  +  **  +  ** 
UNDERP  -  ***  -  ***  -  ***  -  *** 
GROWTH  -    -    -    -   
PROFIT  +    +    +    +   
OPRISK  +    +    +    +   
OPTIONS  -  ***  -  ***  -  ***  -  *** 
NONOPINC  -    -  **  -    -   
EPSGRW  +    +  *  +    +   
SALESGRW  +  ***  +  **  +  ***  +  *** 
RETEARN  -  ***  -  ***  -  ***  -  *** 
STOCKRET  -  ***  -  ***  -  ***  -  *** 
Wald Chi2     268,6    365,7    228,6    242,2 
 
Table 4B: Hazard Models – Panel 2: All Observations and Dividend Payers and Non-Payers 
The following tables present the coefficient estimates and p-values from the semi-parametric Cox-Proportional Hazard Model 
explaining the timing dimension of the initial repurchase decision, using a sample of initial repurchase firms. Definitions of 
the variables employed here are provided in table 2 and in appendix 1 with details. 
Dividend Samples  All Observations 
Payers  Non-Payers 
Variables 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
SIZE  0.092  0.000***  0.061  0.028**  0.191  0.000*** 
PAYOUT  -0.005  0.616  0.012  0.414  0.136  0.396 
LEVERAGE  0.268  0.066*  0.360  0.376  0.134  0.000*** 
CASH  0.154  0.000***  -0.425  0.201  0.449  0.172 
CASH FLOW  0.625  0.038  1.947  0.028**  0.625  0.038 
UNDERP  -0.006  0.001***  -0.005  0.094*  -0.008  0.001*** 
GROWTH  -0.231  0.435  -1.807  0.030**  -0.166  0.596 
PROFIT  0.417  0.148  0.957  0.360  0.618  0.052* 
OPRISK  0.002  0.468  0.008  0.000***  -0.008  0.848 
OPTIONS  -6.023  0.000***  -2.413  0.076*  -6.348  0.000*** 
NONOPINC  -2.199  0.102  -1.564  0.558  -1.072  0.494 
EPSGRW  0.003  0.387  0.000  0.994  0.000  0.966 
SALESGRW  0.007  0.001***  -0.026  0.890  0.007  0.001*** 
RETEARN  -0.047  0.000***  -0.174  0.032**  -0.046  0.001*** 
STOCKRET  -0.165  0.008***  -0.017  0.940  -0.201  0.000*** 
Wald Chi2     268.6    90.3    311.6 
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Table 4B: Hazard Models – Panel 3: Market-to-Book Quartiles 
The following tables present the coefficient estimates and p-values from the semi-parametric Cox-Proportional 
Hazard  Model  explaining  the  timing  dimension  of  the  initial  repurchase  decision,  using  a  sample  of  initial 
repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in table 2 and in appendix 1 with 
details. 
M-B Quartile 1  M-B Quartile 2  M-B Quartile 3  M-B Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.141  0.000***  0.077  0.006***  0.143  0.000***  0.035  0.249 
PAYOUT  0.000  0.975  0.033  0.685  -0.041  0.437  -0.143  0.207 
LEVERAGE  0.311  0.171  0.719  0.028**  -0.238  0.578  -0.663  0.073* 
CASH  -0.238  0.492  0.042  0.531  0.201  0.022**  0.202  0.001*** 
CASH FLOW  0.353  0.677  0.309  0.583  0.567  0.379  1.071  0.043** 
UNDERP  -0.035  0.000***  -0.229  0.002***  -0.066  0.139  -0.002  0.186 
GROWTH  0.242  0.659  -0.013  0.984  -1.023  0.080  -0.982  0.104 
PROFIT  2.391  0.001***  0.345  0.577  0.223  0.744  -0.480  0.192 
OPRISK  0.002  0.692  -0.001  0.786  0.020  0.070*  -0.012  0.367 
OPTIONS  -2.737  0.026**  -5.802  0.000***  -5.530  0.000***  -10.45  0.000*** 
NONOPINC  -1.523  0.599  1.308  0.603  -6.527  0.000***  -0.967  0.741 
EPSGRW  0.000  0.385  0.014  0.080*  -0.020  0.800  0.004  0.668 
SALESGRW  0.001  0.940  0.003  0.311  0.088  0.012**  0.021  0.000*** 
RETEARN  -0.186  0.000***  -0.129  0.073*  0.011  0.884  -0.011  0.059* 
STOCKRET  -0.348  0.001***  -0.013  0.896  -0.238  0.065*  -0.187  0.011** 
Wald Chi2     81.18    112.46    113.90    344.54 
 
Table 4B: Hazard Models – Panel 4: Size Quartiles 
The following tables present the coefficient estimates and p-values from the semi-parametric Cox-Proportional 
Hazard  Model  explaining  the  timing  dimension  of  the  initial  repurchase  decision,  using  a  sample  of  initial 
repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in table 2 and in appendix 1 with 
details. 
Size Quartile 1  Size Quartile 2  Size Quartile 3  Size Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  1.506  0.000***  1.593  0.000***  1.178  0.000***  0.059  0.120 
PAYOUT  -0.367  0.064*  -0.117  0.165  0.271  0.168  0.037  0.332 
LEVERAGE  -1.057  0.012**  -0.426  0.200  0.276  0.361  0.487  0.053* 
CASH  0.081  0.230  -0.142  0.297  0.047  0.511  -0.342  0.174 
CASH FLOW  1.361  0.068*  0.830  0.278  0.559  0.359  3.044  0.002*** 
UNDERP  0.029  0.001***  0.014  0.357  -0.084  0.000***  -0.005  0.033** 
GROWTH  0.751  0.167  0.249  0.645  -0.89  0.135  -2.426  0.035** 
PROFIT  -1.069  0.042**  -0.043  0.929  -0.234  0.609  0.978  0.175 
OPRISK  -0.002  0.629  0.007  0004***  -0.000  0.987  0.005  0.316 
OPTIONS  -1.568  0.065*  -2.385  0015**  -3.706  0.002***  -6.877  0.000*** 
NONOPINC  8.154  0.018**  2.176  0.636  0.435  0.860  -4.157  0.012** 
EPSGRW  0.008  0.813  -0.009  0.066*  0.031  0.008***  -0.000  0.586 
SALESGRW  0.012  0.000***  -0.164  0.288  -0.275  0.148  -0.017  0.893 
RETEARN  -0.017  0.555  -0.014  0.568  -0.098  0.000***  -0.061  0.060* 
STOCKRET  -0.085  0.015**  -0.296  0.007***  -0.386  0.000***  -0.025  0.716 
Wald Chi2     229.83    370.93    398.74    89.24 
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Table 4B: Hazard Models – Panel 5: Four Time Period Windows 
The following tables present the coefficient estimates and p-values from the semi-parametric Cox-Proportional 
Hazard  Model  explaining  the  timing  dimension  of  the  initial  repurchase  decision,  using  a  sample  of  initial 
repurchase firms. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in table 2 and in appendix 1 with 
details. 
1980-87  1988-92  1993-97  1998-2004  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.209  0.083*  0.328  0.000***  0.206  0.000***  0.045  0.020** 
PAYOUT  0.056  0.730  0.242  0.153  -0.003  0.812  -0.094  0.075* 
LEVERAGE  1.003  0.077*  1.315  0.002***  0.550  0.172  -0.106  0.610 
CASH  -0.542  0.062*  0.056  0.837  0.294  0.000***  0.159  0.000*** 
CASH FLOW  5.748  0.009***  -2.211  0.129  1.843  0.007***  0.372  0.352 
UNDERP  -0.066  0.318  -0.104  0.620  0.009  0.027**  -0.006  0.002*** 
GROWTH  -2.046  0.037**  1.541  0.155  -0.899  0.094*  -0.363  0.419 
PROFIT  -5.923  0.033**  4.288  0.025**  0.258  0.761  0.036  0.904 
OPRISK  0.041  0.658  -0.007  0.470  0.004  0.032**  0.001  0.765 
OPTIONS  3.009  0.151  1.280  0.476  -9.793  0.000***  -3.655  0.000*** 
NONOPINC  -0.988  0.877  -13.33  0.084*  -16.66  0.000***  -2.227  0.206 
EPSGRW  -0.023  0.383  -0.029  0.055*  0.001  0.832  0.001  0.011** 
SALESGRW  0.055  0.126  -0.431  0.151  0.070  0.001***  0.011  0.005*** 
RETEARN  -0.055  0.681  -0.311  0.037**  -0.168  0.013**  -0.050  0.001*** 
STOCKRET  0.039  0.016**  -0.044  0.652  -0.124  0.089*  -0.245  0.000*** 
Wald Chi2     70.04    77.19    216.00    159.34 
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Appendix 1 
 
In this study, we use the following variables:  
 
- SIZE (measured as in Dittmar, 2000); 
 
In the matched-pairs approach, we control for size and industry but in the other empirical tests 
we use size as a proxy for information asymmetry (Vermaelen, 1981; Dittmar, 2000), because 
large firms are believed to have less uncertainty regarding future cash flows and, therefore, to 
have a lower level of information asymmetry. 
 
- PAYOUT (measured as in Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002);  
 
We include PAYOUT variable in the analysis because another common explanation for stock 
repurchases is that firms repurchase stock as a substitute for cash dividends because stock 
repurchases  are associated with a lower tax burden for stockholders (capital gains versus 
ordinary income) and increased financial flexibility. 
 
- LEVERAGE (as measured in Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Grullon and Michaely, 2002); 
 
We  use  LEVERAGE  to  account  for  the  effect  of  current  financial  risk  and  flexibility  in 
explaining stock repurchases. Presumably, if stock repurchasing firms are below their optimal 
capital  structure,  then  the  increase  in  leverage  associated  with  stock  repurchases  should 
increase firm value for reasons related to tax, agency and signaling considerations.  
 
- CASH (as measured in Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002); 
 
We  include  CASH  to  test  whether  firms  engage  in  initial  stock  repurchases  to  distribute 
excess cash in response to agency, signaling or maturity considerations. In addition, CASH is 
used to check the possibility of dividend substitution by initial stock repurchases.   
 
- CASHFLOW (as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000); 
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CASHFLOW is included to account for agency, signaling or maturity considerations, which 
all suggest that firms with high level of cash flow would benefit more by repurchasing stock. 
Hence, we test the hypothesis that this may not be the case for initial repurchases. 
 
- UNDERP (underpricing as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000);  
 
Ikenberry  et  al  (1995)  show  that  firms  with  low  market-to-book  ratios  earn  abnormal 
performance in subsequent years. Thus, as this variable may indicate a firm’s potential for 
undervaluation and future abnormal returns, we include the variable UNDERP to capture the 
potential  undervaluation  effect  driving  initial  repurchase  decisions.  We  estimate  the 
association  between  market-to-book  ratios  and  initial  repurchase  decisions  incremental  to 
proxies for actual and future growth, enabling us to interpret the coefficient on market-to-
book ratios as relating to undervaluation and predict a positive relation. Also, controlling for 
size,  we  decrease  the  possibility  for  market-to-book  ratios  to  proxy  for  information 
asymmetry. 
 
- GROWTH (growth options); 
 
The  amount  of  capital.,  advertising  and  R&D  expenditures  is  used  to  measure  a  firm’s 
reliance  on  future  growth  opportunities  and,  hence,  to  help  testing  agency,  signaling  or 
maturity hypotheses for initial stock repurchases. In particular, we predict a different relation 
between growth and initial repurchases vis-à-vis secondary repurchases. 
 
- PROFIT (profitability as measured in Dittmar, 2000); 
 
We also use PROFIT to account for the effect of agency, signaling or maturity hypotheses in 
explaining initial stock repurchases.  
 
- OPRISK (operating risk as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000; Jagannathan and Stephens, 
2003); 
 
In the matched-pairs approach, we control for size and industry in order to hold constant (at 
least partially) some economic attributes as is the case of operating risk. In the other tests, we 
use operating risk to present evidence supporting some of the most common explanations of  
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stock repurchases, specially, maturity and free cash flow theories. 
 
- OPTIONS (stock options as measured in Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002); 
 
The variable OPTIONS is included to test the management incentive to distribute cash by 
repurchasing  stock  in  order  to  avoid  earnings  per  share  dilution  and    reporting  earnings 
disappointments. 
 
- NONOPINC (Non operating income  as measured in Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan 
et al., 2000); 
 
We also use NONOPINC as a proxy for temporary cash flow to emphasize the potential role 
of initial stock repurchases flexibility as a mechanism to distributing temporary cash flows 
and, hence,  to test the substitution effect between initial repurchases and dividends. 
 
- EPSGW (actual growth rate of earnings per share) and SALESGW (actual growth rate of 
sales) 
 
Sales and EPS growth are used as proxies for current growth that may be positively related to 
potential agency costs of free cash flows. EPS growth is also included following evidence 
reported by Brav et al (2005) that managers posit the desire to increase earnings per share 
among their list of repurchase reasons. 
 
- RETEARN (retained earnings as measured in DeAngelo et al., 2005); 
 
We proxy the firms’ stage in their financial lifecycle by using the earned-contributed capital 
mix variable of DeAngelo et al., (2005), that measures the extent to which the firm is self-
financing or reliant on external capital. The variable RETEARN is, therefore, included to 
capture  this  potential  life  cycle  effect,  that  allows  us  to  test  maturity  and  signaling 
considerations. In effect, firms in the early stages of their lifecycle have large and valuable 
investment opportunities and limited retained earnings, so they retain all internal cash flow 
available,  specially  when  external  financing  is  very  costly  due  to  larger  asymmetric 
information costs.  
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-  STRET  (stock  returns)  and  STRET1  (dummy  variable  for  the  stock  returns  at  initial 
repurchase year) 
 
These variables measure the managerial incentive to time the market with stock repurchase 
transactions and the degree of stocks’ potential undervaluation. In particular, STRET1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one when the return on the stock in the initial repurchase year 
is higher than the average return in the three-year period preceding the initial repurchase. 
 
- STREP (stock repurchase amount as suggested by Grullon and Michaely, 2002 and Banyi et 
al., 2005) and PROBINREP (stock initial repurchases); 
 
PROBINREP and STREP are the independent variables. PROBINREP is a dummy variable 
which  equals  one  if  the  observation  is  an  initial  stock  repurchase  transaction,  and  zero 
otherwise and STREP is  the amount of stock repurchased (in millions of US dollars). 
 
- INDUSTRY (industry dummies based on two digit SIC codes); 
 
Prior  research  has  identified  a  firm’s  industry  as  a  potentially  important  determinant  of 
financial decisions, specially high growth and competitive industries characterized by strong 
operating and technological risks and cyclical businesses . This is clearly also true for stock 
repurchases. Therefore, we capture any industry fixed effects by including dummy variables 
corresponding to 2 to 4-digit SIC codes. 
 
- AGE (as measured in Lemmon-Zender, 2003 and Bulan et al., 2003); 
 
We define age as the amount of time (in years) since the ﬁrms’ first positive stock price on 
Compustat-CRSP until the date of its initial repurchase. Knowing the IPO date allows us to 
study the evolution of financial decisions, including repurchases, as firms mature. We follow 
firms from the year of their IPO (between 1975 and 2002) until their first stock repurchase.  
 
 
 